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Y E S H I V A  U N I V E R S I T Y
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO
SCHOOL OF LAW
The Intellectual Property Law Program at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University, boasts an exceptional full-time and
adjunct faculty and a wide range of courses and
externships for Cardozo students. In addition to
offering a J.D. program, Cardozo is one of the few
American law schools that offers an LL.M. in
intellectual property law. The Program is devoted
to furthering an understanding of intellectual
property law in the academy and among the prac-
ticing bar, and to facilitating legal reform. To this
end, Cardozo publishes the Arts and Entertainment
Law Journal, sponsors the Annual Tenzer Lecture
in Intellectual Property Law, runs the premier
intellectual property and entertainment law moot
court competition, and hosts frequent ground-
breaking symposia and lectures. The Occasional
Papers series is part of this effort. Written by
Cardozo faculty; special guests; and participants
in, and friends of, the IP Program, the Papers are
offered to stimulate new ways of thinking about
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This Article is adapted from the author’s forthcoming
book, Reinventing U.S.-China Intellectual Property Policy:
Forging a Sustainable Partnership in the Twenty-first
Century, to be published by Kluwer Law International.
The Article was presented at the Tenth Annual
Conference on International Intellectual Property Law
and Policy at Fordham University School of Law and the
2002 Annual Conference of the U.S.-China Lawyers
Society. The title of the Article was inspired by, and
borrowed from, PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CHINA (1997). Portions of the article originally appeared
in the American University Law Review and the Boston
University International Law Journal.
THE SECOND COMING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA
Peter K. Yu*
At the Doha Ministerial Conference, member states of the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) approved China’s admission to the interna-
tional trading body.
1
After fifteen years of exhaustive negotiations,
China finally became a member of the WTO on December 11, 2001.
2
While the WTO membership will undoubtedly bring new challenges to
the Chinese intellectual property system, this historic milestone pro-
vides us with an opportunity to reflect on the past development of intel-
lectual property rights in China.
Throughout the Chinese imperial history, the country had not devel-
oped any notion of intellectual property rights. Although that notion
was imported into China in the late nineteenth century, substantive
intellectual property protection did not emerge until the early twentieth
century. Unfortunately, with decades of wars, warlordism, famines, rev-
olutions, and political struggles, China was unable to develop an intel-
lectual property system until it reopened its market to foreign trade in
the late 1970s.
3
By that time, information and high-technology goods have already
become a major sector of the American economy.
4
To protect its eco-
nomic interests, the United States aggressively pushes for a universal
intellectual property regime that offers information and high-technolo-
gy goods uniform protection throughout the world. During the past two
decades, the United States repeatedly threatened China with a series of
economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal of most-favored-nation
(“MFN”) status, and opposition to entry into the WTO.
This Article traces the development of intellectual property rights in
China since the country’s reopening in the late 1970s. Part I provides a
brief history of the Chinese intellectual property system and examines
the various intellectual property disputes between China and the United
States in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. This Part argues that the
3
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contemporary Chinese intellectual property system was not developed
until intellectual property rights reemerged in China in the late 1970s.
Part II discusses the causes of the piracy and counterfeiting problem in
China. By focusing on the significant political, social, economic, cultur-
al, and ideological differences between China and the West, this Part
agues that China’s problem can be attributed to the Confucian beliefs
ingrained in the Chinese culture, the country’s socialist economic sys-
tem, the leader’s skepticism toward Western institutions, the xenopho-
bic and nationalist sentiments of the populace, the government’s cen-
sorship and information control policy, and the significantly different
Chinese legal culture and judicial system. Part III examines the various
improvements in intellectual property protection in China since the
mid-1990s, including the recent amendments to the Chinese copyright,
patent, and trademark laws. This Part explains why intellectual proper-
ty protection has improved even though the U.S. government and
American businesses have backed away from their earlier coercive tac-
tics. This Part concludes by offering insight into the impact of the WTO
membership on intellectual property protection in China.
I.   A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
THE CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM
A. The First Coming of Intellectual Property Rights in China
Throughout China’s millennia-long imperial history, the country had
not developed any notion of intellectual property rights. As Professor
William Alford pointed out in his seminal work, To Steal a Book Is an
Elegant Offense,
5
the earliest effort to regulate publication and reproduc-
tion was through an edict issued by Emperor Wenzong of the Tang
dynasty in A.D. 835.
6
This edict “prohibited the unauthorized reproduc-
tion by persons of calendars, almanacs, and related items that might be
used for prognostication.”
7
Because the Chinese considered the emper-
or to be the link between human and natural events, this prohibition
was needed to protect the emperor against findings that would have
undermined the dynasty or predicted its downfall.
8
By the end of the
Tang dynasty, the edict was further expanded to “prohibit[] the unau-
thorized copying and distribution of state legal pronouncements and
4
official histories, and the reproduction, distribution, or possession of
‘devilish books and talks’ (yaoshu yaoyan) and most works on Buddhism
and Daoism.”
9
Rather than fostering creation and promoting authorship,
this edict was designed to sustain imperial power.
The Song dynasty expanded this portion of the Tang Code
10
to include
prepublication review and registration by “order[ing] private printers to
submit works they would publish to local officials.”
11
The principal goal
of this institution was “to halt the private reproduction of materials that
were either subject to exclusive state control or heterodox.”
12
In addition
to works covered by the Tang edict, prohibited materials included autho-
rized versions of the classics, model answers to imperial service exami-
nations, maps, materials concerning the inner workings of government,
politics, and military affairs, pornography, and writings using the names
of members or ancestors of the imperial family in “inappropriate” liter-





this review and registration system was
mainly instituted to control the dissemination of ideas.
In the trademark context, the dynastic codes “restrict[ed] the use of
certain symbols associated with either the imperial family (such as the
five-clawed dragon) or officialdom.”
15
They also “barred the imitation of
marks used by the ceramists of Jingdezhen and others making goods for
exclusive imperial use” and forbid certain craftspersons from exporting
their works.
16
In addition, guild regulations, clan rules, and local laws
protected producers of tea, silk, cloth, paper, and medicines by register-
ing their brand names and symbols they had developed.
17
Tight family
control and screening of employees also were used to protect the confi-
dentiality of vital manufacturing processes.
18
Nonetheless, the dynastic
codes and the various regulations and control efforts did not result in
any formal, centralized intellectual property protection.
19
Indeed, China did not attempt to introduce substantive intellectual
property protection until the early twentieth century. Such protection
arrived “with such inventions and novel ideas as the gunboat, opium,
‘most favoured nation’ trading status, and extraterritoriality.”
20
When
China first opened its coastal ports to Western trade in the 1840s, “there
was little foreign investment in China, and trade was confined to items
such as opium, tea, and raw silk, sold as bulk commodities, rather than
under brand names.”
21
While “there were periodic allegations of inferior
grades of tea being passed off as their more costly counterparts,”
22
sub-
stantial problems of intellectual property piracy did not arise until
5
decades later. By the turn of the twentieth century, foreign imports and
investment had increased substantially, and intellectual property piracy
had become a serious problem.
23
To protect the intellectual property rights of its nationals, the United
States, which had recently acceded to the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property
24
and had enacted the Chace Act
25
to
provide formal intellectual property protection to foreigners, used its
military and economic strengths to induce China to sign a commercial
treaty in 1903.
26
This treaty represented the United States’s first attempt
to build a Western intellectual property regime in China.
27
It granted
copyright, patent, and trademark protection to Americans in return for
reciprocal protection to the Chinese.
28
Despite the 1903 treaty and similar commercial treaties with Britain
and Japan,
29
China did not introduce a substantive copyright law until
1910, a substantive patent law until 1912, and a substantive trademark
law until 1923.
30
Although these laws appeared on paper, they offered
foreigners very limited intellectual property protection.
31
In fact, due to
increasing industrialization, the growth of the urban elite, and the
spread of literacy, the piracy problem worsened despite the introduction
of new intellectual property laws.
32
The failure of the 1903 treaty can be attributed to several factors.
First, the United States failed to consider the relevance of its intellectu-
al property model to China and premised the new regime on registra-
tion.
33
Hampered by problems that were uniquely Chinese, such as geo-
graphical difficulties, high corruption, and strong regional protection-
ism, the registration system turned out to be substantially ineffective,
rendering the new intellectual property laws virtually unenforceable.
Second, the United States was unable to convince the Chinese govern-
ment why intellectual property laws could benefit China.
34
Indeed, most
Chinese officials, including the very powerful Empress Dowager, were
skeptical of the need for legal reforms. To these officials, law reforms
were merely “an unfortunate short-term expedient needed to calm the
restive masses and appease the treaty powers before Qing power could
be reasserted in its proper form.”
35
Finally, the United States did not
rally the support of Chinese holders of intellectual property rights
behind the new intellectual property regime.
36
The United States also
failed to train Chinese officials with responsibilities in the field and to
educate the Chinese populace about the importance of, and rationales
behind, intellectual property rights.
37
6
Instead, the United States “presumed that foreign pressure would suf-
fice to induce ready adoption and widespread adhesion to [the new
intellectual property] laws.”
38
In the beginning, China was willing to
comply with the treaty because it naïvely assumed that introducing
intellectual property laws would put an end to the unequal treaties
signed in the latter half of the nineteenth century, in particular the
extraterritoriality provisions,
39
which allowed foreigners accused of
crimes against Chinese subjects to be tried in China according to their
own laws by the representatives of their home government.
40
Once the
Chinese government realized that legal reforms would not affect China’s
semi-colonial status, it lost interest in pursuing those reforms. In fact,
the Chinese government took advantage of the Western position and
used legal reforms to provide leverage against the treaty powers.
41
During the Republican era, which immediately followed the fall of
the Qing dynasty, intellectual property rights managed to receive some
legislative attention. Shortly after Guomindang took power in 1928, they
promulgated a new copyright law, affording protection to books, music,
photographs, designs, sculpture, and other technical, literary, and artis-
tic works.
42
The Nationalist government also issued a new trademark
law
43
and promulgated the Measures to Encourage Industrial Arts,
which afforded protection to indigenous inventions.
44
Notwithstanding
these efforts, “the decades of wars, famines and revolutions scarcely
gave [intellectual property rights] a chance to take root in China.”
45
Moreover, implementation of the new laws was significantly hampered
by the fact that the laws were transplanted from abroad with scant alter-
ation and presumed a legal structure and consciousness that did not
exist in China at that time.
46
After the Second World War, the prospects of intellectual property
protection became even gloomier. In 1949, the Chinese Communist
Party established the People’s Republic of China. By the early 1950s, the
government had “nationalized industry and commerce, collectivized
agricultural production and embarked on a socialist command econo-
my.”
47
In such a politico-juridical environment in which formal law and
administrative bureaucracy were denounced,
48
“the very notion of pri-
vately owned monopolies or exclusive rights in the use of expressions,
ideas and names became meaningless.”
49
Even though China reopened
its markets in 1979 and allowed people to own limited private property,
the Chinese had yet to develop a respect for intellectual property rights.
7
8
B. The Second Coming of Intellectual Property Rights in China
Immediately after the reopening, China and the United States signed
the Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of
America and the People’s Republic of China,
50
marking the beginning of
Western intellectual property protection in post-Mao China. This
Agreement provided that “each party shall seek, under its laws and with
due regard to international practice, to ensure to legal or natural persons
of the other Party protection of patents and trademarks equivalent to
the patent and trademark protection correspondingly accorded by the
other Party.”
51
The Agreement also provided that “each Party shall take
appropriate measures, under its laws and regulations and with due
regard to international practice, to ensure to legal or natural persons of
the other Party protection of copyrights equivalent to the copyright pro-
tection correspondingly accorded by the other Party.”
52
Pursuant to this
Agreement, China became a member of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”) in 1980 and the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property
53
in 1984. China also promulgated a
new trademark law
54




Even though the new trademark and patent laws granted individuals
rights in their marks and inventions, these laws were designed mainly
to promote “socialist legality with Chinese characteristics.”
56
Uneasy
about the introduction of private property and potential conflicts
between intellectual property rights and the socialist economic sys-
tem,
57
the Chinese government placed substantial limits on the rights
granted under the new statutes. Consider for example Article 6 of the
1984 Patent Law.
58
While this provision granted patent protection to “job-
related invention-creation,” it limited ownership to the work unit (dan-
wei), the enterprise, or the joint venture.
59
The implementing regula-
tions further defined the term “job-related invention-creations” broadly
to encompass virtually anything made on or in relation to one’s job,
using materials or data from one’s unit, or within a year of leaving one’s
unit.
60
Given the importance of a work unit in a socialist economy
61
and
the difficulty in securing sophisticated equipment or sizable capital at
the time the statute was promulgated,
62
the statute had effectively frus-
trated individuals from holding job-related patents in their own names.
In the beginning, the United States was willing to compromise its
intellectual property rights, because the country was eager to lure China
into the “family of nations.”
63
By the mid-1980s, however, attitudes of
U.S. businesses had changed.
64
Impatient with the lack of improvement
in intellectual property protection in China, these businesses lobbied
the U.S. government to take proactive action to eradicate the Chinese
piracy and counterfeiting problem. Since the late 1980s, the United
States has repeatedly threatened China with a series of economic sanc-
tions, trade wars, non-renewal of MFN status, and opposition to entry
into the WTO.
1.   1992 Memorandum of Understanding
In 1989, at the urging of American businesses,
65
the United States
Trade Representative (“USTR”) placed China on the “priority watch
list.”
66
By doing so, the United States gained leverage in negotiations
with China while it did not need to initiate an investigation under sec-
tion 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
67
(“section 301”), which permits the
President of the United States to investigate and impose sanctions on
countries engaging in unfair trade practices that threaten the United
States’s economic interests.
68
In response to being placed on the priori-









Notwithstanding these legislative efforts, the United States found
intellectual property protection in China unsatisfactory. On April 26,
1991, the United States upgraded China to a “priority foreign country.”
72
A month later, the United States initiated a Special 301 investigation on
China’s intellectual property rights practices.
73
To increase its leverage,
the American government threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs of
$1.5 billion on Chinese textiles, shoes, electronic instruments, and phar-
maceuticals.
74
China quickly responded with countersanctions of a sim-
ilar amount on American commodities such as aircraft, cotton, corn,
steel, and chemicals.
75
Hours before the deadline for imposing sanc-
tions, both countries averted a potential trade war
76
by signing the
Memorandum of Understanding Between China (PRC) and the United
States on the Protection of Intellectual Property
77
(“1992 MOU”).
Pursuant to the 1992 MOU, China amended the 1984 Patent Law,
78
promulgated new patent regulations,
79
and acceded to the Patent
Cooperation Treaty.
80
The new patent law extends the duration of patent
protection from fifteen to twenty years, affords protection to all chemi-
cal inventions, including pharmaceuticals and agrichemical products,
and sharply restricts the availability of compulsory licenses.
81
9
In addition, China acceded to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
82
and ratified the Geneva
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms.
83
To comply with these
newly adopted multilateral treaties, the Chinese government amended
the 1990 Copyright Law and issued new implementing regulations.
84
The amended copyright statute protects computer software programs as
literary works for fifty years, removes formalities on copyright protec-
tion, and extends protection to all works originating in a member of the
Berne Union, including sound recordings that have fallen into the pub-
lic domain.
85
A year later, China updated its trademark law by including
criminal penalties within the statute.
86
It also adopted a new unfair com-
petition law that affords protection to trade secrets.
87
Taken as a whole, the 1992 MOU was very successful in establishing
a new intellectual property regime in China. However, a regime alone
was not enough, especially when it was not properly implemented. By
1994, American businesses again complained about the lack of intellec-
tual property protection in China and the significant losses incurred as
a result.
88
The 1995 National Trade Estimate Report estimated that U.S.
industries suffered almost $850 million in losses due to copyright theft
alone.
89
The entertainment and business industries were greatly con-
cerned because China exported its counterfeit products to other coun-
tries.
90
According to then-USTR Mickey Kantor, enforcement of intellec-
tual property laws in China was “sporadic at best and virtually non-exis-
tent for copyrighted works.”
91
In addition to inadequate intellectual
property protection, a study by the United States Semiconductor
Industry Association identified other problems, such as “the imposition
of ad hoc taxes and charges, corruption, smuggling, frequent sweeping
changes in laws and regulations, and the blurring of lines of authority.”
92
2.   1995 Agreement
On June 30, 1994, the USTR again designated China a “priority for-
eign country” and immediately initiated a Special 301 investigation.
93
By
December 31, the two countries still had not reached an agreement.
94
To
allow time for more negotiations, the Clinton Administration extended
the negotiation period for sixty days.
95
The Administration also threat-
ened to impose 100% tariffs on over $1 billion worth of Chinese imports,




response, China retaliated with a counterthreat of 100% tariffs on U.S.-
made compact discs, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and other prod-
ucts.
97
China also announced that it would suspend negotiations with
American automakers over the creation of joint ventures in China for
manufacturing mini-vans and passenger cars, one of the top trade pri-
orities of the Clinton Administration.
98
According to the Xinhua News
Agency, China’s international news service, China needed to take such
retaliatory measures “to protect its sovereignty and national dignity.”
99
Both trade sanctions were slated to take effect on February 26, 1995.
100
Despite these threats and counterthreats, the countries reached a
compromise hours before the February 26 deadline. Through an
exchange of correspondence, the two countries reached the Agreement
Regarding Intellectual Property Rights
101
(“1995 Agreement”), averting
another potential trade war.
102
While many attributed this last-minute
compromise to the closure of twenty-nine CD factories, including the
notorious Shenfei Factory in Shenzhen,
103
most China watchers were not
surprised by the eleventh-hour agreement.
104
As one commentator
noted, “[t]oo much was at stake for both countries. U.S. businesses did
not want to lose deals or to be edged out of China’s market, and China
could ill afford to be shut out of the U.S. market, which absorbs a third
of its exports.”
105
The 1995 Agreement comprised a letter from Chinese Minister of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Wu Yi to then-USTR Mickey
Kantor
106
(“Agreement Letter”) and the Action Plan for Effective
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
107
(“Action
Plan”). The Agreement Letter summarized the enforcement measures
China had undertaken in the past few months or would undertake in the
near future.
108
The letter also included a pledge to improve market
access for American products
109
and to promote transparency by pub-
lishing all laws, rules, and regulations concerning limitations on
imports, joint ventures, and other economic activities.
110
Suspiciously,
the Action Plan did not contain any provisions regarding market access
of American products.
111
Such omission strongly suggests that a compro-
mise was struck between the two governments during the negotiations.
Moreover, the Agreement Letter delineated the mutual responsibili-
ties that would be undertaken by both countries, which included train-
ing customs officers and bureaucrats, exchanging information and sta-
tistics, and undertaking future consultations.
112
The end of the
Agreement Letter contained the United States’s promise to terminate its
11
section 301 investigation of China and China’s “priority foreign country”
designation,
113
as well as a mutual agreement to rescind the order impos-
ing retaliatory tariffs on the other country’s exports.
114
Unlike the Agreement Letter, the Action Plan was more detailed,
focusing specifically on improving the enforcement structure
115
and the
legal environment regarding intellectual property protection.
116
The
Action Plan included short-term and long-term remedial measures
117
and
a 6-month “special enforcement period,” during which China would
make intensive efforts to crack down on major infringers of intellectual
property rights and to target regions in which infringing activity was
particularly rampant at the time of the Agreement.
118
The Action Plan also introduced a new enforcement structure known
as the State Council Working Conference on Intellectual Property Rights
(“Working Conference”), which was responsible for the central organi-
zation and coordination of protection and enforcement of all intellectu-
al property laws throughout the country.
119
This Working Conference
was designed specially to target local protectionism
120
and the vulnera-
bility of the Chinese judicial system to that problem.
121
In addition, the Action Plan created Enforcement Task Forces, which
comprised administrative and other authorities responsible for intellec-
tual property protection. Such authorities included the National
Copyright Administration, the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce, the Patent Office, police at various levels, and customs offi-
cials.
122
These Task Forces were authorized to enter and search any
premises allegedly infringing on intellectual property rights, to review
books and records for evidence of infringement and damages, to seal
suspected goods, and to confiscate materials and implements directly
and predominantly used to make infringing goods.
123
If the Task Forces
found infringement, they had authority to impose fines; to order a stop-
page of production, reproduction and sale of infringing goods; to revoke
production permits; and to confiscate and destroy without compensa-
tion the infringing goods and the materials and implements used to
manufacture the counterfeit products.
124
To protect CDs, laser discs (“LDs”), and CD-ROMs, the Action Plan
established a unique copyright verification system.
125
It proposed to pun-
ish by administrative and judicial means any manufacturer of audiovi-
sual products who failed to comply with the identifier requirement.
126
It
also called for title registration of foreign audiovisual products and com-
puter software in CD-ROM format with the National Copyright
12
13
Administration and local copyright authorities.
127
Moreover, it contained
provisions requiring all customs offices to intensify border protection
for all imports and exports of CDs, LDs, CD-ROMS, and trademarked
goods.
128
Finally, the Action Plan stipulated that relevant authorities would
conduct training and education on intellectual property protection
throughout China.
129
The plan stated that the Working Conference would
“make publicly available the laws, provisions, regulations, standards,
edicts, decrees and interpretations regarding the authorization, man-
agement, and implementation of intellectual property rights.”
130 
To fos-
ter a better understanding of the legal provisions and methods for pro-
tecting intellectual property rights in China, the Working Conference
also would compile and publish guidelines regarding application and
protection in the areas of copyright, patent, and trademark.
131
Initially, many commentators considered the 1995 Agreement “the
single most comprehensive and detailed [intellectual property] enforce-
ment agreement the United States had ever concluded.”
132
U.S. govern-
ment officials also found early implementation of the Agreement
promising.
133
By November 1995, however, the Agreement had become
apparently inadequate to induce effective intellectual property protec-
tion in China.
134
3.   1996 Accord
On April 30, 1996, the Clinton Administration again designated China
as a “priority foreign country” for its failure to protect intellectual prop-
erty rights.
135
A couple of weeks later, the Administration announced its
intention to impose approximately $2 billion worth of trade sanctions on
Chinese textiles, garments, consumer electronics, sporting goods, and
bicycles.
136
Within thirty minutes of the announcement, China respond-
ed with a retaliatory sanction of a similar amount on American agricul-
tural products, cars and car parts, telecommunications equipment, and
CDs.
137
While the two countries were posturing for a compromise, China
closed down fifteen CD factories, six major CD distribution markets, and
more than 5000 minitheaters that showed pirated videos for a fee.
138
China also “expanded permission for foreign music and movie compa-
nies to produce and sell their products inside China.”
139
In light of these
remedial measures, the United States reached a new accord
140
with
China just before the June 18 deadline.
141
According to then-Acting USTR
Charlene Barshefsky: “China’s actions over the past few weeks demon-
strate that the core elements of an operational [intellectual property]
enforcement system are in place. As a result of these actions, sanctions
will not be imposed.”
142
Likewise, China rescinded its threatened coun-
tersanctions.
143
As before, this eleventh-hour compromise did not surprise trade ana-
lysts and sinologists, who had anticipated such a compromise when the
trade sanctions were first announced.
144
The retaliatory tariffs would
have hurt both the Chinese textiles industry and the American aero-
space, automobile, and agricultural industries.
145
The tariffs might even
have closed the Chinese market to American cultural products while
opening it up to products from Europe, Japan, Australia, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan.
146
Thus, it would have been in the interest of both countries
to reach an agreement that would avert a potential trade war.
Nonetheless, for political and diplomatic reasons, it was important for
both countries to take a firm stand regarding their positions before
reaching a compromise.
147
Indeed, commentators have suggested that
the last-minute compromise had benefited the Clinton Administration
in the domestic political arena.
148
Unlike the 1992 MOU and the 1995 Agreement, which spelled out
new terms, the 1996 Accord mainly reaffirmed China’s commitment to
protect intellectual property rights.
149
This Accord included measures
China had undertaken in the past few months and those it would under-
take in the near future. It also confirmed the market access arrange-
ments concluded under the 1995 Agreement.
150
In light of prior dealings and the two previous ineffective agree-
ments, business executives and trade analysts were very skeptical of the
effectiveness of this new Accord.
151
In fact, the Accord suggests the con-
trary, reflecting instead China’s increasing reluctance to bow down to
American pressure in its intellectual property negotiations.
152
Even
though the Accord stipulated that the Chinese government would close
its piracy factories, the Accord did not contain any provisions allowing
American officials to monitor or conduct on-site verification of factory
closings.
153
Instead, to verify such closings, U.S. officials must “rely on
the word of local officials, who may be beholden to local interests.”
154
14
C. The Need for a New U.S.-China Intellectual Property Policy
By 1996, it had become obvious that the existing U.S.-China intellec-
tual property policy was ineffective, misguided, and self-deluding.
155
Although China initially had serious concerns about the United States’s
threats of trade sanctions, the constant use of such threats by the U.S.
government has led China to change its reaction and approach. The
United States not only lost its credibility,
156
but its constant use of trade
threats had helped China improve its ability to resist American
demands.
157
Such threats and bullying also created hostility among the
Chinese people, making the government more reluctant to adopt
Western intellectual property law reforms.
158
Even worse, the ill-advised bilateral policy had created what I call the
“cycle of futility,” which, in retrospect, explains the events and
brinkmanship surrounding the 1992 MOU, the 1995 Agreement, and the
1996 Accord.
159
The cycle begins when the United States threatens China
with trade sanctions. China then retaliates with countersanctions of a
similar amount. After several months of bickering and posturing, both
countries come to an eleventh-hour compromise by signing a new intel-
lectual property agreement. Although intellectual property protection
improves during the first few months immediately after the signing of
the agreement, the piracy problem revives once international attention
is diverted and the foreign push dissipates. Within a short period of
time, American businesses again complain to the U.S. government, and
the cycle repeats itself.
To be fair, the coercive bilateral policy has strengthened intellectual
property protection in China in various ways. For example, the 1992
MOU and 1995 Agreement were instrumental in establishing a new
intellectual property regime in China
160
and the institutional infrastruc-
ture needed to protect and enforce rights created under that regime.
161
The trade threats and coercive tactics increased the awareness of intel-
lectual property rights among the Chinese people, in particular govern-
ment officials. These threats and tactics also put intellectual property at
the forefront of the U.S.-China bilateral trade agenda, thus attracting
interests of Chinese leaders in implementing legal reforms in the area.
Finally, they provided the reformist leaders with the needed push that
helps reduce resistance from their conservative counterparts.
162
Nonetheless, most of the things that could be accomplished through
a coercive bilateral policy have been achieved. A continuation of this
15
policy not only would be ineffective and futile, but also would jeopar-
dize the United States’s longstanding interests in other areas such as
international trade and human rights.
163
Indeed, the United States would
be better off saving its hard-earned political capital for other difficult
cross-border issues, such as terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, illegal
arms sales, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, refugees, ille-
gal immigration, and bribery and corruption. Thus, scholars, policy-
makers, and commentators have called for a critical assessment and
reformulation of the U.S.-China intellectual property policy.
II.   CAUSES OF THE PIRACY AND 
COUNTERFEITING PROBLEM IN CHINA
To understand why it is so difficult to eradicate the piracy and coun-
terfeiting problem in China, one must focus on the significant political,
social, economic, cultural, and ideological differences between China
and the West. While it is true that some Chinese are eager to free ride
on the creative efforts of Western authors and inventors and consider
piracy and counterfeiting a low-risk, lucrative business, this fact
explains only the causes of rampant criminal commercial piracy and
counterfeiting in China.
164
It, however, does not explain the reluctance
of Chinese leaders to implement intellectual property law reforms, the
lack of consciousness of intellectual property rights among the Chinese
public, and the significant institutional barriers that impair the protec-
tion and enforcement of intellectual property rights in China. Instead,
one must focus on the Confucian beliefs ingrained in the Chinese cul-
ture, the country’s socialist economic system, the leader’s skepticism
toward Western institutions, the xenophobic and nationalist sentiments
of the populace, the government’s censorship and information control
policy, and the significantly different Chinese legal culture and judicial
system.
A. Confucianism and Cultural Practices
For more than 2000 years, the Chinese had been heavily influenced
by Confucianism,
165
which provided “the blueprint of an ideal life”
166
and
the yardstick against which human relationships were to be measured.
167
To the Chinese, the past was not only a reflection of contemporary soci-
16
ety, but also the embodiment of cultural and social values.
168
By encoun-
tering the past, one could understand the Way of Heaven,
169
obtain guid-
ance to future behavior,
170
and find out the ultimate meaning of human
existence.
171
One also could transform oneself and build his or her moral
character through self-cultivation.
172
Thus, materials and information
about the past had to be put in the public domain for people to borrow
or to transmit to younger generations.
173
Because intellectual property
rights allow a significant few to monopolize these needed materials,
they prevent the vast majority from understanding their life, culture,
and society. Intellectual property rights therefore “contradict[] tradition-
al Chinese moral standards.”
174
Unlike Westerners today, the Chinese in the imperial past did not
consider copying or imitation a moral offense. Rather, they considered
it “a noble art,”
175
a “time-honored learning process”
176
through which
people manifested respect for their ancestors.
177
At a very young age,
Chinese children were taught to memorize and copy the classics and
histories.
178
On the one hand, such undertaking would instill in the
youngsters familial values, filial piety, and respect for their cultural
legacy. On the other hand, copying was practically needed to ensure
success in the imperial civil service examinations,
179
which emphasized
the knowledge of the Confucian Four Books and the Five Classics.
180
Success in those examinations would bring not only power and glory to
the candidates, but also honor to their families, districts, and provinces.
When the Chinese grew up, they became by training compilers, as
compared to composers.
181
“Having memorized vast sequences of the
classics and histories, they constructed their own works by extensive
cut-and-paste replication of phrases and passages from those sources.”
182
To the Chinese, the classics and histories constituted the universal lan-
guage
183
through which they communicated.
184
Although their unac-
knowledged quotation may be considered plagiarism today, the Chinese
in the imperial past regarded such a practice as an acceptable, legiti-
mate, or even necessary, component of the creative process. Indeed,
Chinese writers from early times saw themselves more as preservers of
historical record and cultural heritage than as creators.
185
Even
Confucius, one of the greatest philosophers of all time, proudly
acknowledged that he had “transmitted what was taught to [him] with-
out making up anything of [his] own.”
186
To a very great extent, this compiling tradition was similar to that
held by Westerners before the emergence of the contemporary notion of
17
authorship in the eighteenth century.
187
Unlike contemporary writers,
“[m]edieval church writers actively disapproved of the elements of orig-
inality and creativeness which we think of as essential component of
authorship. ‘They valued extant old books more highly than any recent
elucubrations and they put the work of the scribe and the copyist above that
of the authors.’”
188
Although writers in later periods changed their atti-
tudes toward originality and creativeness, they did not espouse modern
attitudes toward plagiarism. Rather, like the Chinese people, they
regarded imitation as the sincerest form of flattery and a necessary com-
ponent of the creative process.
189
For example, in The Defence of Poesy,
Sir Philip Sidney maintained that poetry “is an art of imitation . . . [and]
counterfeiting.”
190
Likewise, “Shakespeare engaged regularly in activity
that we would call plagiarism but that Elizabethan playwrights saw as
perfectly harmless, perhaps even complimentary.”
191
Finally, the Chinese subscribed to the Confucian vision of civiliza-
tion. Under this vision, the family constituted the basic unit of human
community, and the world was an outgrowth of this basic unit.
192
Emphasizing familial values and collective rights,
193
the Chinese did not
develop a concept of individual rights. They also did not regard creativ-
ity as individual property. Instead, they considered creativity as a col-





they greatly despised those who created works
for sheer profit.
196
B. Socialist Economic System
While the Communist government did not emphasize Confucianism
until very recently,
197
its view on the function of creative works is simi-
lar to that of the Confucianists.
198
Under the socialist economic system,
property belongs to the State and the people, rather than private own-
ers. Authors thus create literary and artistic works for the welfare of the
State, rather than for the purpose of generating economic benefits for
themselves.
199
Indeed, in a socialist society, “owning property is tanta-
mount to a sin. Thus, stealing an object that is owned by someone else
is less corrupt than owning it outright yourself.”
200
This aversion of private property was particularly strengthened by
the numerous mass campaigns and endless class struggles that took
place during the Mao era. Among the various mass campaigns, the




During the Cultural Revolution, the government heavily criticized
scientists, writers, artists, lawyers, and intellectuals and routinely con-
demned them to harsh prison terms.
202
Fearing political repercussions,
many Chinese became “unwilling to acknowledge their personal role in
[creative and] inventive activity.”
203
Instead, they used pseudonyms and
put pure and non-identifying labels, such as “Red Flag,” “East Wind,” and
“Worker-Peasant-Soldier,” on their products.
204
Even worse, many Chinese developed contempt for authorship and
remuneration from creative efforts. As one comrade would argue during
the Cultural Revolution, “[i]s it necessary for a steel worker to put his
name on a steel ingot that he produces in the course of his duty? If not,
why should a member of the intelligentsia enjoy the privilege of putting
his name on what he produces?”
205
Even though Deng Xiaoping and
other Chinese leaders tried to rehabilitate the intelligentsia after the
Cultural Revolution by enhancing their positions and facilitating their
endeavors,
206
these reforms have yet to cultivate respect for intellectual
property rights.
C. Self-strengthening Worldview
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, China was constant-
ly attacked by Western powers. The first major attack came in the early
1840s, when Britain defeated China in the Opium War. Under the Treaty
of Nanking of 1842, China ceded Hong Kong Island to Britain and was
forced to open five coastal ports to Western trade.
207
Since the Opium
War, China had experienced repeat attacks by Western imperialist pow-
ers and was forced to sign unequal treaties giving out significant eco-
nomic and territorial concessions. Such submission eventually led to
the “Scramble for Concessions” in 1898, in which foreign imperialist
powers carved the country “into leased territories and spheres of inter-
est, within which they constructed railways, opened mines, established
factories, operated banks, and ran all kinds of exploitive organiza-
tions.”
208
Desperate to save the country, the Chinese adopted a self-strength-
ening worldview, under which attaining independence and liberating
the nation became the country’s first priority.
209
In the beginning, self-
strengthening was mainly limited to diplomatic, military, and industri-
al reforms.
210
After China’s defeats in the Sino-French War in 1885 and
the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, reformers in China realized the inade-
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quacy of limited modernization and the need for drastic institutional
changes. Inspired by successful reforms introduced by Peter the Great
and Emperor Meiji, these reformers advocated radical reforms of the
civil service examinations, education, and political institutions.
211
Unfortunately, due to the reformers’ inexperience and the strong con-
servative opposition in the imperial court, these reforms remained
largely futile.
212
The 1911 Revolution led to the abdication of the Manchu Emperor,
ending 268 years of Qing rule and more than 2000 years of imperial
dynasties.
213
Notwithstanding the founding of the new republic, China
had yet to experience peace, order, or unity. In fact, “the early republi-
can years were characterized by moral degradation, monarchist move-
ments, warlordism, and intensified foreign imperialism.”
214
Frustrated
by China’s backwardness and its semi-colonial status, the new intelli-
gentsia, many of whom were trained in the West or were influenced by
Western philosophy, advocated “a radical change in the philosophical
foundations of national life.”
215
In particular, they “called for a critical re-
evaluation of China’s cultural heritage in the light of modern Western
standards, a willingness to part with those elements that had made
China weak, and a determination to accept Western science, democra-
cy, and culture as the foundation of a new order.”
216
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party established the People’s
Republic of China. Despite the change in government, the self-strength-
ening worldview persists. Subscribing to this worldview, many Chinese
believed it was right to freely reproduce or to tolerate the unauthorized
reproduction of foreign works that would help strengthen the country.
217
Some of them also believed that copying was needed, or even neces-
sary, for China to catch up with Western developed countries. Thus, one
could easily find bookstores containing “special” rooms selling pirated
works from Western publishers.
218
One also could find Reference News
(Cankao Xiaoxi) providing translated excerpts from foreign news materi-
als published abroad.
219
Even today, the Chinese sometimes refer to
pirated computer programs “as ‘patriotic software,’ out of a belief that it
speeds the nation’s modernization at little or no cost.”
220
D. Skepticism, Xenophobia, and Nationalism
Before the Opium War, the Chinese regarded foreigners as “outer bar-




Ignorant and complacent, Emperor Qianlong of
the Qing dynasty told King George III of England: “We possess all things.
I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your
country’s manufactures.”
222
A couple of centuries later, the scientific
progress and military prowess of Western powers had proven Qianlong
wrong. In fact, they brought China two centuries of tremendous pain
and humiliation. It was not until the resumption of sovereignty in Hong
Kong in 1997 that China was able to recover from all the unequal
treaties signed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Although China’s defeats in the Opium War and the subsequent
Arrow War had awakened the Chinese and made them aware of their
country’s backwardness, many Chinese, in particular those in the impe-
rial court, were still skeptical of Western technology, ideas, and institu-
tions.
223
Indeed, “[t]he great majority of the scholar-official class regard-
ed foreign affairs and Western-style enterprises as ‘dirty’ and ‘vulgar,’
beneath their dignity.”
224
As a result, China’s early modernization efforts
were limited to firearms, ships, machines, communications, mining,
and light industries, and “[n]o attempts were made to assimilate Western
institutions, philosophy, arts, and culture.”
225
Indeed, the skepticism of
the conservative Qing court was one of the main reasons for the failure
of these modernization efforts.
226
While skepticism toward Western objects and ideas made the Qing
court reluctant to introduce modernization reforms, the xenophobic and
nationalist sentiments among the Chinese populace
227
made implemen-
tation of those reforms difficult. To a very great extent, the Chinese
nationalist and xenophobic sentiments were “a reaction to the humilia-
tion that China suffered under the hands of Western imperialism.”
228
These sentiments began to grow after China’s defeat in the Opium War,
which led to rapid inflation and an influx of foreign goods.
229
Subsequent
foreign attacks and signings of unequal treaties also resulted in the
unpopular invasion of Christianity and unwanted presence of foreign
troops, ministers, consuls, missionaries and traders in China.
230
By the turn of the twentieth century, foreign industries and invest-
ments had dominated almost all modern industries and enterprises in
China.
231
Such domination disrupted the self-sufficient agrarian econo-
my, displaced the native handicraft industries,232 and shattered tradi-
tional family relationships.
233
Added to these hardships were floods in
Shandong, Sichuan, Jianxi, Jiangsu, and Anhui and a severe drought in
northern China.
234
Fueled by socio-economic distress and nationalist
21
sentiments, the Chinese vented their frustration on foreigners and for-
eign enterprises.
235
Notable outbursts of anti-foreign sentiments in the
late Qing and Republican period included the Tianjin Massacre of
1870,
236
the Boxer Uprising in 1900,
237
and the May Fourth Movement in
1919.
238
During the Mao era, xenophobia and nationalism were primarily
used “to mobilize domestic resources to catch up with advanced Western
powers and prevent China’s further victimization.”
239
Keenly aware of
China’s misfortunes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Mao and
his followers were “national Communists at heart.”
240
Like the reformers
in the Qing period, they had “a burning desire to restore China’s right-
ful position under the sun, to achieve the big power status denied it
since the Opium War, and to revive the national confidence and self-
respect that had lost during a century of foreign humiliation.”
241
Nonetheless, the repeated power struggles within the Chinese leader-
ship made Mao’s dreams unfulfilled.
When Deng Xiaoping returned to power in the late 1970s, he adopt-
ed a different and more pragmatic approach. Instead of putting “politics
in command,” Deng saw economic wealth as the foundation of China’s
power.
242
“According to Deng, whether China could have a rightful place
in the world of nations depended on China’s domestic economic devel-
opment.”
243
Although his predecessors emphasized national unity, Deng
believed that “national unity depended on whether China could catch
up with the developed countries.”
244
Thus, he vigorously pushed for the
Four Modernizations,
245
the renewal of diplomatic and commercial ties
with the United States, Japan, and other Western developed countries,
246
and the establishment of Special Economic Zones.
247
With the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997, many commentators sug-
gested that there might be a resurgence of xenophobic and nationalist
sentiments. According to these commentators, “a new ideology is nec-
essary as faith in Marxism or Maoism declines[,] and nationalism, if han-
dled properly, can justify the political legitimacy of leadership.”
248 
These
commentators cited as evidence the two recent bestsellers, China Can
Say No
249
and Behind a Demonized China,
250
the Chinese reaction to the
United States’s bombing of their embassy in Belgrade,
251
and China’s
recent standoff with the United States over the collision of its jet fighter
and a U.S. reconnaissance plane.
252
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E. Censorship and Information Control Policy
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the
Communist government has exercised very strict control over the dis-
semination of information and the distribution of media products.
253
The
logic behind such control is that, as an instrument of political indoctri-
nation and mass mobilization,
254
media not only has the ability to create
an atmosphere conducive to political development, but also can help
mobilize the masses and foster political struggle.
255
Thus, information
control and content regulations are needed to ward off those politically
sensitive materials that would destabilize the country and the
Communist regime.
256
Today, the media business and the publishing
industry remain the most heavily regulated industries in China.
257
Consider imported films for example. As the Motion Picture
Exhibitors Association of America alleged, “China has an unofficial,
unwritten, ‘shadowy’ system of quotas for films, video, and television.”
258
Initially, the Chinese authorities imposed a sales scheme in which all
imported films would be licensed at a low, flat rate.
259
In 1994, they
replaced this scheme by allowing ten recent blockbusters to be import-
ed on a revenue-sharing basis.
260
During the U.S.-China intellectual prop-
erty talks in 1996, the Chinese authorities further eliminated this ten-
imports-per-year quota.
261
They also ended the monopoly of China Film
Distribution and Exhibition Company over film distribution and allowed
Chinese film studios to sign cooperative agreements with U.S. film pro-
ducers to distribute foreign motion pictures.
262
Although the government
soon backpedaled on its new policy,
263
the film industry is opening up as
China enters the WTO. For example, under the U.S.-China Bilateral
Market Access Agreement signed on November 15, 1999, China
promised to “allow[] at least 20 films annually into China on a revenue-
sharing basis . . . [and] to open theaters and distribution to foreign
investment.”
264
Apart from imported films, Chinese authorities place heavy restric-
tion on imported books and audiovisual products. Under Chinese regu-
lations, wholly foreign-owned enterprises are forbidden to sell books, for
“[s]uch activities might expose foreigners to ‘internal’ publications and
other sensitive materials which foreigners are not permitted to see.”
265 
In
addition, they “are not allowed to engage in the publication or repro-
duction sector.”
266
Instead, they must form a joint venture with a state-
approved Chinese publishing or reproduction unit.
267
As with other local
23
Chinese publishing or reproduction units, these joint ventures are sub-
ject to re-registration every two years.
268
They also must abide by the
various censorship laws and regulations, which list in details the type of
contents prohibited by the government.
269
Due to this stringent information control policy, many media prod-
ucts are not available even if they are in great demand in the Chinese
market.
270
As a result, consumers have to settle for black market prod-
ucts or pirated goods,
271
which are often inferior to, and are sometimes
indistinguishable from, the genuine products.
272
As time passes, the
Chinese market would become saturated with these infringing substi-
tutes. Even when the market is finally open, it might be difficult for the
foreign manufacturers and distributors to capture the market.
273
F.   Laws with Chinese Characteristics
Finally, the Chinese have an entrenched tradition of regarding laws
as an inefficient, arbitrary, and cumbersome instrument for gover-
nance.
274
As Confucius explained in the Analects: “Govern the people by
regulations, keep order among them by chastisements, and they will
flee from you, and lose all self-respect. Govern them by moral force,
keep order among them by ritual and they will keep their self-respect
and come to you of their own accord.”
275
Although many considered this
tradition a Confucian legacy, such an aversion to law can actually be
traced back to the Western Zhou period (1122-771 B.C.), during which rit-
uals were emphasized.
276
Under this tradition, the Chinese lived by the concept of li (rites),
rather than the concept of fa (law). Broadly defined, li extended beyond
one’s proper conduct or etiquette and covered the whole range of polit-
ical, social, and familial relationships that encompass a harmonious
Confucian society.
277
People who were guided by this concept always
understood their normative roles, responsibilities, and obligations to
others. They also were ready to adjust their views and demands in order
to accommodate other people’s needs and desires, to avoid confronta-
tion and conflict, and to preserve harmony.
278
As a result, litigation and
promotion of individual rights became unnecessary in a Confucian soci-
ety.
In contrast to li, “fa is a penal concept; it is associated with punish-
ment, serving to maintain public order through the threat of force and
physical violence.”
279
Unlike the Confucianists, the Legalists believed
24
that it was impossible to teach people to be good. Thus, fa is needed to
tell people what to do and to induce them to do what they should do.
Except in the Qin dynasty in the third century B.C., fa jia (legalism) has
never been the dominant Chinese ideology.
280
In fact, the Chinese
always viewed fa unfavorably and associated it with the harsh and
despotic Qin rule, which unified China and centralized its bureaucra-
cy.
281
They assumed that “when government leans heavily on fa to rein-
force its authority, it does so because it has no effective ability to rule by
li.”
282
To the Chinese, fa should always be employed as the last resort.
283
During the Mao era, formal laws were denounced as “inherently
bureaucratic, hampered by legislative formalities and fed on profession-
al interests, slow to come, rigid in procedure, prone to ramifying into
technical details and yet unable to cover all the circumstances of the
ever-changing social relationships.”
284
To replace this “defective” legacy,
Mao instituted socialist laws that “operate within the boundaries of pol-
icy directives, under the guidance of policy principles and supplement-
ed by various policy tools (such as a Party or government circular or
notice).”
285
“Throughout the Cultural Revolution and until Mao’s death in
1976, law was simply a mechanism for implementing Party policy,
interpreted and reinterpreted to reflect the direction of the prevailing
political winds.”
286
Even today, laws are still considered a “concrete formulation of the
Party’s policy.”
287
As “a summary of practical administrative and judicial
experience,”
288
laws do not “necessarily constitute a detailed, compre-
hensive and self-containing rule system, justifiable on ideological as
well as jurisprudential grounds, with coherent principles and well-
defined concepts.”
289
They also can be “incomplete, incoherent, ideolog-
ically compromising, as well as broadly and vaguely termed pending
further administrative and judicial experience in its implementation.”
290
Furthermore, laws are intended to be flexible
291
and can be formulat-
ed “on an interim or trial use basis.”
292
Given the rapid social and eco-
nomic changes, laws will likely fall behind policies.
293
Statutory provi-
sions that are effective in one year may therefore be outdated in the fol-
lowing year had a new policy or a new law been implemented in the rel-
evant or related areas. To determine the applicability and effectiveness
of a provision, one must examine all the laws and supplementary docu-
ments, including administrative rules and judicial interpretations, in all
the relevant and related areas.
294
In most cases, the more specific and
updated provisions prevail.
25
Chinese laws “are generally broadly drafted, leaving the detailed
rules to be provided by the relevant administrations under the State
Council.”
295
Thus, “it is often the detailed administrative implementing
rules that provide the concrete information about the definition, limits,
and practical implication of legal rights established in the laws.”
296
Contrary to Western beliefs and expectations, these rules sometimes
exceed the explicit provisions of the laws they are supposed to explain.
They also may add rights and rules that were not previously conceived
by the legislature when it adopted the laws.
297
Nevertheless, the Chinese
lacked a concept of separation of powers
298
and found these expansions
and modifications acceptable.
III.   RECENT IMPROVEMENTS IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA
In light of the differences between China and the West, legal reforms
in the intellectual property area would be highly ineffective unless they
were sensitive to the characteristics of Chinese society and the local
socio-economic conditions. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the
United States relied heavily on pressure and ultimata to reform the
Chinese intellectual property system in the image of American laws.
Unfortunately, because the U.S. government failed to take into account
the differences between China and the West, its policy had largely
failed.
Ironically, however, intellectual property protection in China has
improved significantly since the U.S. government and American busi-
nesses backed away from their earlier coercive tactics. Since 1996, the
Chinese government has taken considerable measures to improve intel-
lectual property protection in China. In August that year, China issued
the Regulations on the Certification and Protection of Famous
Trademarks,
299
thus bringing its laws into conformity with the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPs Agreement”).
300
China also issued the Regulations on the
Protection of New Plant Varieties
301
and amended its Criminal Law to
include a section on intellectual property crimes.
302
In April 2000, China
became a member of the International Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants.
303




Meanwhile, China conducted institutional reforms to improve the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. In April
1998, the Chinese government upgraded the State Patent Bureau to a
ministry-level branch of the State Council, known as the State
Intellectual Property Office.
305
This office replaced the State Council
Working Conference on Intellectual Property Rights,
306
which was estab-
lished by the 1995 Agreement. Working closely with the State
Administration of Industry and Commerce and the State Press and
Publication Administration,
307
the new office is responsible for improv-
ing intellectual property protection and coordinating regional intellec-
tual property rights department to intensify enforcement of laws and
regulations.
308
It is also responsible for building a patent information net-
work,
309
assisting enterprises and research institutions to protect their
own technology and products, and cooperating with other countries to
speed up China’s intellectual property protection to meet international
standards.
310
To facilitate research and provide training, the China Intellectual
Property Training Center was established in Beijing in January 1997.
311
This Center provides a training and research base on intellectual prop-
erty rights and offers copyright, patent, and trademark courses to gov-
ernment officials, lawyers, patent and trademark agents, and business
people.
312
It also holds international and regional seminars and training
courses with WIPO.
313
In April 1998, China opened the first government-
run center for training special personnel for the country’s intellectual
property rights department.
314
In addition, many Chinese universities
now offer courses on intellectual property,
315
and some even have intel-
lectual property departments or offer degrees in intellectual property
law.
316
Most recently, as China was preparing to enter the WTO, it revamped
its entire intellectual property system, amending copyright, patent, and
trademark laws and adopting a new regulation on the protection of lay-
out designs of integrated circuits.
317
The new amendments to the patent
law came into effect on July 1, 2001. These amendments aligned the
patent law with the changing socialist market economy, strengthened
patent protection, simplified examination and issuance procedures, and
harmonized the law with international standards and treaties.
318
Under
the revised patent law, enforcement authorities may confiscate income
from infringing products and fine violators,
319
and the right to apply for




Where damages cannot be determined, the
revised law allows for the calculation of damages based on appropriate
royalties.
321
It also prohibits the “offers for sale” of infringing products
322
and enables patent holders to request immediate suspension of poten-
tially infringing acts before requesting a formal legal determination.
323
In addition, the law simplifies the application procedures,
324 
allows for
judicial review of patent revocations,
325
heightens the standard for com-
pulsory license,
326
and requires innocent infringers to prove that the
patented product comes from a legitimate source.
327
Four months later, the amendments to the copyright law went into
effect, strengthening copyright protection and improving the law’s com-
pliance with the TRIPs Agreement. Under the revised copyright law,
administrative agencies and courts are authorized to order confiscation
of illegal gains, pirated copies, and materials, tools, and equipment used
to conduct infringement activities.
328
Where the plaintiff’s damage or the
infringer’s profits cannot be determined, the revised law allows for
statutory damages of up to RMB 500,000.
329
In addition, the law provides
access to preliminary injunctions
330
and places the burden on the
accused infringer to prove the existence of a legitimate license.
331
It also
addresses for the first time copyright issues on the Internet
332
and
includes a reference to China’s contract law as a basis for the fulfillment
of contractual obligations.
333
Finally, the amendments to the trademark law became effective on
December 1, 2001. The revised law delineates the factors needed to





and allows for statutory damages of up to
RMB 500,000 in cases where the plaintiff’s damage or the infringer’s
profits cannot be determined.
336
In addition, it authorizes administrative
agencies and courts to confiscate and destroy counterfeit products and
materials, tools, and equipment used to manufacture these products.
337
It also requires enforcement authorities to transfer cases to judicial
authority for criminal investigation.
338
To strengthen intellectual property protection, China has, from time
to time, launched large-scale crackdowns on pirated and counterfeit
products. Most recently, as a follow-up to the anti-counterfeiting cam-
paign that started in November 2000, China launched a major crack-
down on counterfeit products, focusing primarily on products that pose
health and safety risks, such as food, drugs, medical supplies, and agri-
cultural products.
339
In addition, Chinese leaders stressed the impor-
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tance of intellectual property as an economic strategy,
340
and “books,
television talk shows, media articles, and government and academic
reports have highlighted the importance of [intellectual property] pro-
tection to China’s economic development.”
341
Notwithstanding these reforms and large-scale crackdowns, signifi-
cant problems still exist with the enforcement of intellectual property
laws in China, especially at the grassroots level and in rural areas. There
are also other institutional problems like “local protectionism and cor-
ruption, reluctance or inability on the part of enforcement officials to
impose deterrent level penalties, and a low number of criminal prose-
cutions.”
342
Nonetheless, intellectual property protection has improved
considerably since the early 1990s. As the 2000 National Trade Estimate
Report stated: “Today, China has improved its legal framework—and it
has virtually shut down the illegal production and export of pirated
music and video CDs and CD-ROMS. Indeed, today it is an importer of
such products from third countries.”
343
One might wonder why intellectual property protection in China has
improved even though the U.S. government and American businesses
has backed away from their earlier coercive tactics. After all, the logic
behind the coercive U.S.-China intellectual property policy is that the
Chinese intellectual property regime cannot sustain itself and, there-
fore, requires foreign pushes to rejuvenate the system. While these for-
eign pushes were undoubtedly helpful in establishing the Chinese intel-
lectual property system in the early 1990s, recent improvements in
intellectual property protection in China can be largely attributed to
three other factors.
First, thanks to the efforts of governments, intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations, and foreign and local businesses, the
Chinese people have become increasingly aware of the basic functions
of, and the rationales behind, intellectual property rights. To many
Chinese, these rights are no longer alien, abstract, and incomprehensi-
ble. Rather, they are closely related to one’s daily life and the country’s
domestic growth and international reputation.
Second, the Chinese begin to see the benefits of intellectual property
protection. In the past, many Chinese thought intellectual property
rights were bad for the country. They considered intellectual property
rights as exploitative devices that were designed specifically to protect
the West’s dominant position and the United States’s hegemony.
344




divide the country, and erode its cultural
identity.
346
They also would slow down China’s economic progress and
its rise in world affairs
347
and ensure that the country “follow the path of
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—toward economic decay,
social unrest, and political instability.”
348
Third, and most important of all, many Chinese have become stake-
holders, and intellectual property matters to them. While the impor-
tance of intellectual property rights to the growing computer software
and high-technology industries are apparent,
349
piracy and counterfeiting
hurt the country in many other ways. For example, the lack of intellec-





They also stifle creativity,
reduce tax revenues,
352
impede the development of indigenous authors
and local industries,
353
and pose grave threats to the health and safety of
the local people.
354
Moreover, due to widespread piracy and counterfeit-
ing, local businesses and educational centers are forced to pay higher
prices for the needed foreign technologies and materials.
355 
Consumers
become reluctant to purchase in the open market
356
for fear of buying
fake products despite paying the same price.
357
And worst of all, “the best
and brightest” in China feel compelled to leave the country for the more
remunerative systems abroad.
358
At the international level, the lack of intellectual property protection
has damaged China’s reputation and delayed its entry into the WTO. On
November 10, 2001, member states of the WTO approved China’s acces-
sion to the international trading body.
359
After fifteen years of exhaustive
negotiations, China finally became a member of the WTO.
360
Although
the accession process was complicated and involved many different fac-
tors, it would not be too far-fetched to argue that China might still remain
outside the WTO had it not strengthened its protection of intellectual
property rights. Indeed, some commentators considered the WTO mem-
bership a major impetus for China’s recent improvements in intellectu-
al property protection.
Now that China has joined the WTO, one might wonder whether intel-
lectual property protection will continue to improve. When commenta-
tors analyze the effects of China’s entry into the WTO, they usually fall
into one of two camps—the optimists or the pessimists-or a hybrid
between the two, who considers China’s entry a “double-edged sword.”
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While the optimists maintain that China’s entry will benefit both the
Chinese people and the global community and will allow China to
30
become an economic superpower, the pessimists argue that China’s
entry will exacerbate the existing social-economic problems,
362
thus
resulting in the potential disruption, or even collapse, of the country and
the global trading system.
In the intellectual property field, the optimists believe China’s WTO
membership will lead to stronger intellectual property protection in the
country. As they argued, China’s accession to the WTO will lead to bet-
ter economic conditions in the country. As a result, consumers will no
longer be attracted to low-priced counterfeits and, instead, will seek
higher-priced genuine and luxury goods.
363
Using Taiwan as example,
these observers predicted that “[p]irates and counterfeiters will . . . grad-
ually move into legitimate businesses[,] and the focus of counterfeiting
and piracy will shift away from China to lesser developing countries,
such as Vietnam.”
364
By contrast, the pessimists believe that the piracy and counterfeiting
problem will worsen in the first few years after China’s entry into the
WTO. As access to the Chinese markets increases, the increase of foreign
investment and trade will enhance the economic conditions that give
rise to the piracy and counterfeiting problem in the first place.
365
Reduced restrictions on export privileges also will allow pirates and
counterfeiters to trade more aggressively with markets having “a strong
appetite for low-priced counterfeit goods,” such as southeast Asia and
eastern Europe.
366
Moreover, as the current legal reforms in China focus primarily on
improving the compliance of existing laws with the WTO regime, China’s
recent accession to the WTO might create a disincentive for the country
to carry out further immediate reforms, especially in areas where non-
compliance is questionable, difficult to assess, or hard to prove before
the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.
367
In fact, its “increased stature
as a WTO member will increase its bargaining position and its leverage
against any future pressure to improve its piracy problem.”
368
In light of the uncertainty and the complex nature of the internation-
al trading system, it is very difficult to forecast the impact of China’s
accession to the WTO. Nonetheless, as most commentators tend to agree,
the Chinese economy likely will deteriorate in the first few years after
China’s accession to the WTO.
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However, once China recovers from this
difficult transitional period, the Chinese economy will improve, and




Although the notion of intellectual property rights was imported into
China in the late nineteenth century, the contemporary Chinese intel-
lectual property system was not developed until the late 1970s, when
intellectual property rights reemerged after China reopened its market
to foreign trade. Since then, the United States has been very aggressive
in protecting its intellectual property interests and has threatened
China with a series of economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal of
MFN status, and opposition to entry into the WTO.
While the coercive bilateral policy succeeded initially in introducing
a new intellectual property regime and establishing the institutional
infrastructure needed to protect and enforce rights created under that
regime, it has become ineffective, misguided, and self-deluding by the
mid-1990s. Ironically, however, intellectual property protection has
improved considerably since the U.S. government and American busi-
nesses backed away from their earlier coercive tactics. Such improve-
ments can be largely attributed to the heightened awareness of intellec-
tual property rights among the Chinese populace, the increasing recog-
nition by Chinese leaders and the general public of the benefits of intel-
lectual property protection, and the emergence of local stakeholders in
the Chinese intellectual property system.
After fifteen years of exhaustive negotiations, China finally joined the
World Trade Organization in December 2001. As China enters the WTO,
it will face significant challenges in almost every aspect of its economy
and socio-political system. During this critical transitional period, the
influx of foreign goods and services and the resulting competition will
likely exacerbate the existing socio-economic problems in China. As a
result, the Chinese economy will deteriorate, and the piracy and coun-
terfeiting problem will grow. Nonetheless, as the economy recovers, the
living standards of the Chinese people will be raised, and consumers
might prefer genuine and luxury products to lower-priced knockoffs.
Under this scenario, stronger intellectual property protection will
emerge, and China eventually might join the United States as an eco-
nomic superpower.
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from each other.”). As Professor Boyle pointed out, Shakespeare’s “plagiarism” is the
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BOYLE, supra note 188, at 230 n.12; see also JOHN MICELL, WHO WROTE SHAKESPEARE?
(1999) (examining questions concerning the authorship of Shakespeare’s plays and
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U. L. REV. 625 (1988) (examining the similarities between textual indeterminancy and
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192 See YAO, supra note 165, at 33 (“[Confucian ethics] takes virtues as the corner-
stone of social order and world peace. Its logic is that the family is the basic unit of the
human community and that harmonious family relationships will inevitably lead to a
harmonious society and a peaceful state.”).
193 For discussions of the Chinese communitarian perspective, see generally
DANIEL A. BELL, EAST MEETS WEST: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN EAST ASIA (2000);
CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Wm. Theodore de Bary & Tu Weiming eds., 1998);
WM. THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN
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RIGHTS (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999).
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P.R.C.: Progress Problems, and Proposals, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 140, 160 (1994) [here-
inafter Yu, Progress, Problems, and Proposals]; see ALFORD, supra note 5, at 29 (“[T]rue
scholars wrote for edification and moral renewal, rather than profit.”).
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196 ALFORD, supra note 5, at 29 (“[T]he Confucian disdain for commerce fostered
an ideal . . . that true scholars wrote for edification and moral renewal rather than prof-
it.”); see also Liwei Wang, The Chinese Traditions Inimical to the Patent Law, 14 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 15, 36-56 (1993) (discussing how Confucianism smothered the impulse
to commercial profit).
197 See Wm. Theodore de Bary, Preface to CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 193, at xvi-xvii (discussing the recent revival of Confucianism by the Chinese
leaders); see also YAO, supra note 165, at 274-79 (describing the recent revival of
Confucian values).
198 See ALFORD, supra note 5, at 56 (arguing that the Soviet model “reflected tradi-
tional Chinese attitudes toward intellectual property”); see also PETER HOWARD CORNE,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 25 (1997) (“Mao had no
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199 Hu, supra note 88, at 104; see also Tiefenbrun, supra note 67, at 11 (“The Soviet
model reflected traditional Chinese attitudes toward intellectual property and
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in social activities based on knowledge that belonged to all members of society.”).
200 Tiefenbrun, supra note 67, at 37-38.
201 See CHEN, supra note 10, at 30-33, for a discussion of the impact of the Cultural
Revolution on the Chinese legal system and profession. See generally JUNG CHANG,
WILD SWANS: THREE DAUGHTERS OF CHINA 273-443 (1991), for an insightful personal
account of the Cultural Revolution.
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China, 21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 259, 272 (1986).
205 ALFORD, supra note 5, at 65.
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209 Xiang Rui Gong, Constitutional Protection of Human Rights: The Chinese View
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PARATIVE APPROACH 492 (Johannes Chan & Yash Ghai eds., 1993).
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note 35, at 261-312, for a discussion of the Self-strengthening Movement.
211 See id. at 355-86, 408-18, for a discussion of political reforms in the late Qing
period.
212 See id. at 380-84 for a discussion of the failure of the Reform Movement of
1898.
213 Id. at 474.
214 Id. at 493.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 See Sidel, supra note 204, at 271 (noting the use and application by the Chinese
of technology, techniques, and products developed in more advanced countries with-
out paying any royalties).
218 See Butterton, supra note 155, at 1082 (describing “special” rooms in book-
stores that sell pirated works to local Chinese people).
219 See DANIEL C. LYNCH, AFTER THE PROPAGANDA STATE: MEDIA, POLITICS, AND
“THOUGHT WORK” IN REFORMED CHINA 133 (1999).
220 James Cox, U.S. Firms: Piracy Thrives in China, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 1995, at
2B.
221 See ALFORD, supra note 5, at 30-31; see also HSÜ, supra note 35, at 142 (“The
Chinese attitude toward foreign trade was an outgrowth of their tributary mentality. It
postulated that the bountiful Middle Kingdom had no need for things foreign, but that
the benevolent emperor allowed trade as a mark of favor to foreigners and as a means
of restraining their gratitude.”). See id. at 130-34 for a discussion of the Chinese tribu-
tary mentality.
222 Letter from the Qianlong Emperor to King George III of England, Oct. 3, 1793,
quoted in HSÜ, supra note 35, at 161.
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223 See HSÜ, supra note 35, at 289 (“Western machines and industrial management
were alien to the traditional Chinese mentality.”); see also id. 281-82 (discussing the
conservative opposition within the imperial court).
224 Id. at 289-90; see also id. at 289 (“[M]en of talent and integrity usually steered
clear of foreign matters and enterprises; only the lesser characters were willing to asso-
ciate with the modernization projects . . . .”).
225 See id. at 287.
226 See id. at 289-90 (discussing the social and psychological inertia that hampered
the Self-strengthening Movement).
227 For discussions of nationalist sentiments in China, see generally CHINESE
NATIONALISM (Jonathan Unger ed., 1996); YONGNIAN ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATION-
ALISM IN CHINA: MODERNIZATION, IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 154 (1999) [here-
inafter ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM].
228 ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM, supra note 227, at 154.
229 See HSÜ, supra note 35, at 223-24 (describing the socio-economic impact of the
Opium War on the Chinese people). 
230 Id. at 388. The Treaties of Tientsin in 1858 allowed for the free propagation of
Christianity in the interior. The Conventions of Peking in 1860 further granted mis-
sionaries the right to rent and buy land to build churches. Protected by the flag and the
treaties, the missionaries moved about freely in China.
231 See id. at 432-35 (describing the foreigners’ dominating role in modern Chinese
industries and enterprises). “84 percent of shipping, 34 percent of cotton-yarn spin-
ning, and 100 percent of iron production were under foreign control in 1907, while 93
percent of railways were foreign-dominated in 1911.” Id. at 436.
232 Professor HSÜ described how the impact of foreign goods and investments on
the Chinese economy:
The influx of foreign commodities under preferential customs and the right of
foreigners after 1895 to engage in local manufacturing disastrously affected the
native handicraft industries and agrarian economy. Foreigners dominated
Chinese public utilities, communications, mining, banking, and other modern
enterprises. Their factories, by virtue of vast capital and mass production, out-
sold Chinese rivals even in distant villages. As common an agricultural prod-
uct as cotton was marketed by foreigners more cheaply than the Chinese could
produce it. Farm women who traditionally weaved as a secondary vocation
were thrown out of work, and farmers had increasing difficulty eking out a liv-
ing.
Id. at 427-28.
233 Professor Hsü described the adverse impact of foreign goods and investment
on familial relationships:
The clan and family could no longer provide help and comfort to those mem-
bers who became unemployed, sick, and destitute. The displaced handicraft
worker or the peasant left for the city, where he slipped from family and clan
control; if lucky enough to find a new life, his meager income hardly sufficed
to support his own dependents, let alone the clansmen. The ties between such
a man and his clan became attenuated. Very often the wife and children of
such a man were forced to work in a different city just to scrabble out a living,
thereby scattering further not only clansmen but even immediate family mem-
bers. Little wonder that old familial relationships broke down under the impact
of the foreign economic invasion.
Id. at 428.
234 Id. at 390.
50
235 As Professor Hsü described:
By the end of the 19th century, the country was beset by bankruptcy of village
industries, decline of domestic commerce, rising unemployment, and a gener-
al hardship of livelihood. Many [Chinese] attributed this sorry state of affairs to
evil foreign influence and domination of the Chinese economy. . . . Victims of
natural calamities as well as superstitious scholars and officials blamed the
misfortune on the foreigners, who, they insisted had offended the spirits by
propagating a heterodox religion and prohibiting the worship of Confucius,
idols, and ancestors. Foreigners were accused of damaging the “dragon’s vein”
(lung-mai) in the land when they constructed railways, and of letting out the
“precious breath” (pao-ch’i) of the mountains when they opened mines. The
gentry held foreigners responsible for destroying the tranquility of the land
and interfering with the natural functioning of the “wind and water” (feng shui,
geomancy), thus adversely affecting the harmony between men and nature.
Id. at 389-90.
236 The Tianjin Massacre arose out of rumors that French missionaries bewitched
Chinese children, mutilated their bodies, and extracted their organs to make medicine.
In response to those charges, a Qing official inspected the orphanage. After the official
had found no truth to the wild charges, the French consul, armed with a pistol, con-
fronted the Chinese, demanding justice for the priests and sisters. The mob soon went
out of control, killed the French consul and his assistant, and burned the church and
the orphanage. Ten sisters, two priests, and two French officials were killed. Three
Russian traders lost their lives by mistake. And four British and American churches
were destroyed. See id. at 299-302 for a description of the anti-Christian feelings among
the Chinese that led to the Tianjin Massacre of 1870.
237 During the Boxer Uprising, members of a fin-de-siècle secret society, backed
by Empress Dowager, brutally murdered missionary families, foreign ministers and
diplomats, and Chinese converts. They also besieged embassies and burned churches
and shops that sold foreign merchandise and books. See id. at 386-418 for an overview
of the Boxer Uprising in 1900.
238 The May Fourth Movement began as a mass demonstration by students in
Beijing protesting the verdict of the Versailles Peace Conference, which allowed Japan
to retain Shandong, a territory leased to Germany in 1898 and occupied by Japan dur-
ing the First World War. The demonstration was so powerful and far-reaching that it
evoked an immediate national response. In addition to pressuring the Chinese delega-
tion to reject the treaty, the Chinese boycotted Japanese products and stopped taking
Japanese streamers. Dockhands in China also refused to upload Japanese goods. See
id. at 501-05 for an overview of the May Fourth Movement in 1919.
239 ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM, supra note 227, at 17.
240 HSÜ, supra note 35, at 660.
241 Id. at 660-61.
242 ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM, supra note 227, at 17.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 The Four Modernizations aimed to develop China’s world-class strength in
agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense by 2000. See HSÜ,
supra note 35, at 803-14, for a comprehensive overview of the Four Modernizations.
246 See id. at 858-69 for a discussion of the Open Door Policy adopted by the
Chinese Communist Party in December 1978.
247 The special economic zones seek to experiment with new economic forms
within the framework of “socialist modernization.” These zones allow for a substantial
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Hong Kong’s Succession to the ICCPR, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 53, 104 n.293 (1999) [hereinafter
Yu, Succession by Estoppel]; see also George T. Crane, ‘Special Things in Special Ways’:
National Economic Identity and China’s Special Economic Zones, in CHINESE NATIONALISM,
supra note 227, at 148 (exploring China’s economic identity as revealed in debates sur-
rounding the establishment and expansion of special economic zones).
248 ZHENG, DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM, supra note 227, at 2; see also id. at 17
(arguing that the rise of nationalism in post-Mao China is “a response to the ‘Chinese
problems’ that post-Mao China has encountered”).
249 QIANG SONG ET AL., ZHONGGUO KEYI SHUO BU [CHINA CAN SAY NO] (1996).
250 XIGUANG LI ET AL., YAOMOHUA ZHONGGUO DE BEIHOU [BEHIND A DEMONIZED CHINA]
(1997).
251 Although the United States insisted that the bombing was accidental and apol-
ogized for the incident, many Chinese considered the bombing a deliberate attack to
slow down China’s rise in world affairs and to warn China against challenging
American hegemony. STEVEN M. MOSHER, HEGEMON: CHINA’S PLAN TO DOMINATE ASIA AND
THE WORLD 81 (2000); see also John Pomfret & Michael Lavis, China Suspends Some U.S.
Ties, WASH. POST, May 10, 1999, at A1 (reporting on the anti-American protests outside
the U.S. embassy after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade).
252 See John Pomfret, New Nationalism Drives Beijing, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2001, at
A1 (attributing the recent standoff with Washington to the growing nationalist senti-
ments among the Chinese people); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Many Voices for Beijing, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2001, at A1 (noting that anti-American feelings are running high in
China).
253 See YUEZHI ZHAO, MEDIA, MARKET, AND DEMOCRACY IN CHINA: BETWEEN THE PARTY
LINE AND THE BOTTOM LINE 19 (1998) [hereinafter ZHAO, MEDIA, MARKET, AND DEMOCRACY]
(noting that the Chinese Communist Party “exercised strict control over its publica-
tions from the very beginning”); Shaozhi Su, Chinese Communist Ideology and Media
Control, in CHINA’S MEDIA, MEDIA’S CHINA 75, 77 (1994) (noting that the Chinese
Communist Party “pays utmost attention to ideology”). But see generally LYNCH, supra
note 219 (describing how a combination of property rights reforms, administrative
fragmentation, and technological advance has caused the Chinese authorities to lose
some of its control over propagandistic communication).
254 ZHAO, MEDIA, MARKET, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 253, at 2.
255 Su, supra note 253, at 77.
256 Among the most politically sensitive materials at the moment are articles
inciting the independence of Taiwan and Tibet, stories about political dissidents, mate-
rials promoting Falun Gong, and The Tiananmen Papers. THE TIANANMEN PAPERS: THE
CHINESE LEADERSHIP’S DECISION TO USE FORCE AGAINST THEIR OWN PEOPLE—IN THEIR OWN
WORDS (Andrew J. Nathan & Perry Link eds., 2001).
257 Anna S.F. Lee, The Censorship and Approval Process for Media Products in China,
in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 127, 127 (Mary L. Riley ed., 1997);
Mary L. Riley, The Regulation of the Media in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 64, at 355 (“Media and all media products, are heavily reg-
ulated in China.”); see also Peter K. Yu, Barriers to Foreign Investment in the Chinese
Internet Industry, GIGALAW.COM, at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001/yu-2001-03-
p1.html (Mar. 2001) (discussing content regulations in the Chinese Internet Industry).
258 Butterton, supra note 155, at 1105-06. As one commentator explained:
Government monopolies have essentially controlled all aspects of the Chinese
film industry, from production to distribution and exhibition, by way of the
Ministry of Culture and related agencies. The China Film Distribution and
Exhibition Bureau and its subsidiaries, in collaboration with the central gov-
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ernment, have determined times, places, dates and terms under which films
are shown in Chinese cinemas, and censorship has been performed by the
Ministries of Culture, Information and Film, Television and Radio. Contrary to
standard industry practice in most of the world, China until very recently
refused to permit the licensing of foreign motion pictures in exchange for a
percentage of gross receipts; instead, it imposed a flat sales scheme, demand-
ing that it be allowed to pay US$ 3000 for rights in each film, a figure that is
astonishingly modest by world standards. Moreover, all prints of films so
licensed have had to be made in Chinese film laboratories according to the reg-
ulations of the China Film Bureau. Nor have the Chinese observed the con-
ventional distinction between authorization for home as opposed to commer-
cial use, which has led to the widespread Chinese practice of showing home-
licensed videos in public displays.
Id. at 1106 (footnotes omitted); Lee, supra note 257, at 137 (“Only work units with
import authorization are allowed to engage in the import of foreign films.”); Riley,
supra note 257, at 358 (“Only a publishing unit with the authorized capacity to import
audio-visual products may import such products.”). See generally Mary Lynne Calkins,
Censorship in Chinese Cinema, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 239, 291-96 (1999), for a
discussion of the importation and censorship of non-Chinese films in China.
259 Butterton, supra note 155, at 1106.
260 OFFICE OF USTR, 2001 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BAR-
RIERS 42 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 NTE REPORT]; Calkins, supra note 258, at 291; see also
Seth Faison, A Chinese Wall Shows Cracks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at D1 (reporting on
the liberalization of the Chinese film industry). “Among the movies imported under
this new system were The Lion King, The Fugitive, and True Lies.” Calkins, supra note
258, at 291 (footnotes omitted).
261 Lisa Atkinson, What’s Entertainment?, CHINA BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 38.
262 Id.; Riley, supra note 257, at 365. As a result of this new policy, “the
Changchun Film Studio won the rights to distribute Waterworld, and the Shanghai Film
Studio signed a deal to distribute Toy Story. Movies such as The Piano, Schindler’s List,
Forrest Gump, and True Lies earned high revenues at Chinese box offices.” Calkins,
supra note 258, at 293 (footnotes omitted).
263 Shortly after the announcement of the new policy, the Central Propaganda
Department issued an order demanding self-criticism of the policy of importing large
quantities of U.S. movies. Bian He, Why Prohibit the Importation of Foreign Movies, CHINA
FOCUS, Aug. 1, 1996, available at 1997 WL 11751443.
264 2001 NTE REPORT, supra note 260, at 62.
265 Lee, supra note 257, at 148; Riley, supra note 257, at 377.
266 Lee, supra note 257, at 132; Riley, supra note 257, at 373.
267 Lee, supra note 257, at 132; Riley, supra note 257, at 373.
268 Lee, supra note 257, at 132; Riley, supra note 257, at 361.
269 Lee, supra note 257, at 129-30 (discussing the censorship procedures practiced
by Chinese authorities); Riley, supra note 257, at 357-59 (same).
270 See Robert B. Frost, Jr., Comment, Intellectual Property Rights Disputes in the
1990s Between the People’s Republic of China and the United States, 4 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 119, 132 (1995) (“[W]hen China stalled the import of the film, ‘True Lies,’ because of
the looming trade war, a cinema in Shenzhen had already begun showing a pirated
copy.” (footnote omitted)); Erik Eckholm, Spider-Man Springs into China with More
Than Comics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2000, at E2 (reporting that pirated video compact
discs of X-Men were available in China even though the film itself was not approved
for commercial screening); see also 2001 NTE REPORT, supra note 260, at 55 (“Pirates
find ways to get VCDs and DVDs of blockbuster films into the Chinese market almost
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immediately after the films are released theatrically in the United States.”).
271 See Butterton, supra note 155, at 1105-06 (noting that the film import quota has
“been a fertile ground for pirate practices”); Derek Dessler, Comment, China’s
Intellectual Property Protection: Prospects for Achieving International Standards, 19 FORD-
HAM INT’L L.J. 181, 232 (1995) (“Commentators argue that . . . market access barriers
facilitate intellectual property piracy and impede enforcement.”); Frost, supra note
270, at 132 (“The United States claims that this limitation produces a vacuum effect
which creates a large demand for pirated films.”).
272 See 2001 NTE REPORT, supra note 260, at 55 (noting that “consumers are often
unaware that they are purchasing [intellectual property right]-infringing goods”);
Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 27, at 137 (noting that the piracy
problem in Shanghai “has reached such proportions that officials in Shanghai have
found it necessary to take to the airwaves to inform citizens of where they can shop
without fear of purchasing fakes”).
273 As one commentator explained:
If the Chinese more fully relaxed or lifted barriers to market participation by
foreign [intellectual property rights] owners, those foreign owners could sell
their own goods in China and thereby displace, at least to some extent, pirate
products that now have Chinese markets to themselves. Moreover, absent such
barriers, some U.S. producers could both sell their “authentic” products in the
Chinese market, and also monitor, if not police, infringement themselves on
an in-country basis. Such market access adjustments would have application in
a number of areas. 
Butterton, supra note 155, at 1105.
274 See, e.g., CHEN, supra note 10, at 93 (“[T]he concept and doctrines of legality,
unlike the precepts of Confucianism, had never occupied a central role in traditional
imperial China. There has not existed a legal culture with elements like officials’ fideli-
ty to law or citizens’ consciousness of their legal rights . . . .”); id. at 128 (pointing out
that the legal profession was despised, stigmatized, or sometimes even outlawed in
imperial China); FENG, supra note 20, at 10 (“[T]here is . . . an entrenched Confucian-
strategist tradition which regards formal law as an inefficient and cumbersome instru-
ment for governance.”); Berkman, supra note 121, at 39 (noting the Chinese “prefer-
ence for death rather than bringing a lawsuit”). But see PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CIVIL JUSTICE
IN CHINA: REPRESENTATION AND PRACTICE IN THE QING (1996) (pointing out that state law
and Qing courts played a very important role on community mediation and noting that
parties would resort to courts when community or kin mediation failed); William P.
Alford, Law, Law, What Law? Why Western Scholars of China Have Not Had More to Say
About Its Law, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 45 (Karen G. Turner et al. eds.,
2000) [hereinafter LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW] (exploring why Western scholars of
Chinese history and society have neglected or mischaracterized the effect of law upon
Chinese life).
275 ANALECTS, supra note 172, bk. II, ¶ 3 (footnote omitted). “The Confucianists
criticized the hedonistic pleasure-pain psychology relied on by the Legalists, which,
the Confucianists argued, would lead people to think only in terms of their self-inter-
est and make them litigious, trying to manipulate the laws to suit their own interests.”
CHEN, supra note 10, at 9.
276 William P. Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental? Implications of Roberto Unger’s
Uses and Abuses of the Chinese Past, 64 TEX. L. REV. 915, 930 (1986) (tracing the Chinese
aversion to litigation to the Western Zhou period); Berkman, supra note 121, at 39 n.177
(“The normative aversion to litigation stretches back to pre-unified China, as indicated
in the Book of Changes, dated approximately 1000 B.C.” (citing I CHING, OR BOOK OF
CHANGES 28-30 (Richard Wilhelm trans., Princeton Univ. Press, 3d ed. 1967)));
Butterton, supra note 155, at 1108 (“The concept, though it is widely identified with the
teachings of Confucius (551-479 B.C.), antedated him and appears to have been estab-
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lished in Chinese bureaucratic thought and the larger culture during the Western Zhou
Period (1122-771 B.C.), if not before.”); see also GRAY L. DORSEY, JURISCULTURE: CHINA 87
(1993) (discussing the need for new philosophy created by the disintegration of feudal
society in the Western Zhou period).
277 As one commentator explained:
The “relationships” of Confucian society consist of connections between vari-
ous types of political, social and familial roles. The roles are also normative,
embodying prescriptions that tell those who play the roles how they ought to
act when playing them. Thus, the role of father embodies a norm of proper
fatherly behavior; the role of friend embodies a norm of friendship; and simi-
larly, other norms are expressed for the other fundamental roles of wife, child,
ruler, subject, elder brother and younger brother. Eventually, Confucianism
reduced all relationships to a finite set of fundamental relationships that were
presumed to be exhaustive, the so-called Five Relations which obtained
between father and child, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, ruler
and subject, and friend and friend. The li expressed the rules of conduct
involved in all of these basic relationships, and, at bottom, the li were about the
obligations between parties to relationships.
Butterton, supra note 155, at 1109-10.
278 Id. at 1109; see also Benjamin Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL (Milton Katz ed., 1957) (“The proper dis-
position with regard to one’s interests is the predisposition to yield rather than the pre-
disposition to insist.”), quoted in JEROME A. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963: AN INTRODUCTION 62, 65 (1968); Alice Tay, The Struggle for
Law in China, 21 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 561, 562 (1987) (“Chinese tradition personal-
izes all claims, seeing them in the context of social human relationships.”); Margaret
Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese Courts, in LIMITS OF THE RULE OF
LAW, supra note 274, at 163, 168 (“Today, litigation in the public courts is still viewed
with disfavor in China, for it represents a breakdown in relationships that should be
avoided. Ideally, broken relationships should be restored, but litigation makes restora-
tion difficult.”).
279 Butterton, supra note 155, at 1110.
280 Nevertheless, the adoption of Confucianism as the orthodoxy and the rejec-
tion of Legalism did not mean the abolition of laws. “All the dynastic empires subse-
quent to the Qin dynasty continued to develop codes of law and legal institutions.
There was thus a coexistence of both li and fa in traditional China . . . .” CHEN, supra
note 10, at 11.
281 Butterton, supra note 155, at 1108; see also DORSEY, supra note 276, at 125-30
(discussing legalism in the State of Qin). As one commentator explained: 
The intellectual roots of fa are in the Legalist movement—a group of political
philosophers primarily active in the China of the fourth and third century B.C.,
who held that social order could only be maintained by the use of law as a tool
for manipulating society. The Qin dynasty adopted the Legalist philosophy and
effectively integrated and centralized the whole of the Chinese Empire in the
third century B.C. (221-209 B.C.). The Qin ruled with the aid of a harsh penal
law and brutal tactics, and developed a vast administrative law bureaucracy to
manage the empire they had created. They thus shaped an image of the “rule
of law” as brutal and rigid, and that image endured throughout the greatest
period of Confucian influence from the first century A.D. to the development
of civil-law criminal codes during the late nineteenth-century portion of the
Qing dynasty (1644-1912 A.D.) and the beginning of the Republican period fol-
lowing the 1912 [sic] revolution, when the last incarnation of those codes was
enacted. 
Butterton, supra note 155, at 1110 (footnote omitted).
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282 Butterton, supra note 155, at 1110.
283 See ALFORD, supra note 5, at 10 (“Public, positive law was meant to buttress,
rather than supersede, the more desirable means of guiding society and was to be
resorted to only when these other means failed to elicit appropriate behavior.”); CHEN,
supra note 10, at 11 (“[Fa] is to be employed as a last resort to maintain social order
when li has failed to do so.”); Berkman, supra note 121, at 32 n. 144 (“The Confucian
ideology . . . saw law as an instrument of last resort necessary to punish those who
could not follow the normative ideal of social harmony arising from the many social
relationships within society.”).
284 FENG, supra note 20, at 10; see also CHEN, supra note 10, at 93 (“[T]he ideology
of Marxism-Leninism, not even to mention Mao Zedong Thought, is ambivalent about
the positive contributions of law, particularly outside the realm of the struggle against
counter-revolutionaries, class enemies and criminals.”). 
285 FENG, supra note 20, at 10.
286 Berkman, supra note 121, at 35; see also Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese
Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 713 (1994). As one commentator explained:
Law became an instrument of Mao and the CCP and was used to suppress
“counterrevolutionaries” and protect Mao’s power. The seemingly daily fluctu-
ations in Mao’s political, economic, and social policies destroyed any sense of
predictability in law. On the eve of Deng Xiaoping’s reform movement, China
was a nation of rule by men—or more specifically by one man, Mao—rather
than law. Equally important, the Cultural Revolution had instilled in the mass-
es the cynical view that law was a concern of the government, not the people,
and a tool to create social stability and advance political agendas rather than a
mechanism to protect rights.
Berkman, supra note 121, at 35; see also RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA’S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE
OF LAW 1 (1994); Jerome Alan Cohen, The Criminal Process in the People’s Republic of
China: An Introduction, 79 HARV. L. REV. 469, 470-71 (1966); Shao-Chuan Leng, The Role
of Law in the People’s Republic of China as Reflecting Mao-Tse Tung’s Influence, 68 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 356 (1977).
287 FENG, supra note 20, at 10. As Professor Feng explained:
The CCP policy . . . is more than a political guideline. It is a strategy of social
control maintained by a set of long-standing propaganda, training, experiment,
inspection and enforcement procedures, with its own formality, etiquette,
pedigree and convention. Its objective is that all operators or decision-makers
(administrators and judges included) can “unify thinking” and act pursuant to
the policy “spirit” where concrete rules are inadequate, in conflict or lacking.
As a result, new analyses, interpretations, applications and initiatives are
formed, giving rise to new concrete rules. Some of the rules eventually mature
into statutory provisions. That is why “policy and strategies are”, in Mao’s
words, “the Party life”.
Id.
288 Id. at 11.
289 Id.
290 Id.; see also CHEN, supra note 10, at 90 (“[N]o effective system has yet been
evolved to deal with the problem of inconsistencies between legal norms derived from
different sources.”); CORNE, supra note 198, at 55 (“[I]n the PRC there is no concept, as
exists in Western legal systems, that law or delegated legislation can be struck down
on the basis of uncertainty.”); Claudio Ross & Lester Ross, Language and Law: Sources
of Systemic Vagueness and Ambiguous Authority in Chinese Statutory Language, in LIMITS
OF THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 274, at 221 (regarding vagueness as a structural charac-
teristic of Chinese law).
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291 See CORNE, supra note 198, at 93-145 (discussing flexibility as a characteristic of
Chinese laws); Woo, supra note 278 (examining how the historic Chinese preference
for discretion and informality in the distribution of justice has been retained and
reflected in the judicial decisionmaking process and in the procedural rules); see also
Butterton, supra note 155, at 1113 (“To many, the shifting sands of ‘flexibility’ and ad
hoc adjustments are synonymous with a host of corrupt business practices.”).
292 FENG, supra note 20, at 11. “[A]mong the 713 pieces of laws and administrative
regulations enacted in the period 1979-1985, 25% were of . . . provisional nature.” CHEN,
supra note 10, at 89.
293 FENG, supra note 20, at 11; see also CORNE, supra note 198, at 189 (“[L]aw in
China tends to take on the colour of policy in the course of its implementation. Those
who implement law are the same as those who were responsible for the implementa-
tion of policy under the pre-legal order.”).
294 FENG, supra note 20, at 11.
295 Id. at 12; see also CORNE, supra note 198, at 54 (“The laws [in China] are
expressed in terms of general standards which fail to deal with obvious problems of
implementation. Real clarity exists only at the level of administrative rules and circu-
lars.”).
296 FENG, supra note 20, at 12; see also CORNE, supra note 198, at 239 (“The exis-
tence of discretion allows administrative bodies to apply laws in a way that is consis-
tent with underlying normative expectations held by the regulators. The manner of
implementation is completely different from what Westerners would expect from the
ostensibly familiar principles that are embodied in the law.”).
297 FENG, supra note 20, at 13; see also CORNE, supra note 198, at 147 (“The gener-
al principle of legislative consistency emphasizes consistency with the ‘spirit’ rather
than with the ‘letter’ of the relevant higher law or laws. This is also true with respect
to consistency with the PRC Constitution.”). As one commentator explained:
[I]n the Chinese legal system a rule or regulation is not considered to conflict
with the Constitution per se or with rules or regulations enacted by other
administrative or legislative bodies at the same or higher level, even if it
appears to do so on its face, as long as it fulfills the primary condition of being
within the enacting organ’s entrusted or inherent power. It is this principle that
defines the approach that judicial, administrative and legislative institutions
have taken in respect of this issue.
Id. at 148.
298 See XIANFA art. 128 (1982) (amended Mar. 29, 1993) (“The Supreme People’s
Court is responsible to the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee.
Local People’s courts at various levels are responsible to the organs of state power
which created them.”); BROWN, supra note 120, at 8 (“[T]he governmental congresses
and standing committees are comprised of members primarily selected by Party mem-
bers through a separate Party congress mechanism. Party committees, such as the
Political-Legal Committee, ‘supervise’ the public security (police), procuratorates, and
the courts.”); id. at 35 (arguing that the constitutional basis of the judicial system in
China “is not separation of powers, but on the contrary it is a ‘division of functions and
responsibilities’ under the unified guidance of the organs of state power, i.e., the peo-
ple’s congresses, as guided by the Chinese Communist Party, ‘in accordance with the
law’”); CHEN, supra note 10, at 48 (“The orthodox view expressed in textbooks is that …
the Chinese socialist political system manifests the principle of the unity of delibera-
tion and execution (yixing heyi) which Marx used in discussing the Paris Commune
Movement of 1871.”); CORNE, supra note 198, at 141 (“Administrative interpretation is
not only the most important mode of legal interpretation in the PRC, it is in effect an
authoritative supplement and accretion to legislation.”); id. at 253 (“The trial judge is
very susceptible to [outside] pressures, both internal and external to the court, as his
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decision is only preliminary and may at any time be overridden by an adjudication
committee within the local people’s court under the principle of democratic central-
ism.”); Berkman, supra note 121, at 23 (“When Chinese officials speak of judicial inde-
pendence they may be using a lexicon familiar to westerners, but they certainly do not
intend to connote the separation of powers usually equated with the democratic defi-
nition.”); see also CORNE, supra note 198, at 287 (“China’s lack of an independent legal
tradition and the current low status of the courts will make it very difficult to extricate
the courts from the webs of party and governmental influence which permeate their
decision making processes and undermine their value as a supervisory institution.”). 
One commentator explained the operation of the adjudication committee and the
intertwining relationship between the Party and the judiciary:
An institutional aspect clearly foreign to students of American constitutional
law are China’s Adjudication Committees. Minor, non-politically sensitive
cases can be handled by individual judges, or a collegiate bench of judges and
lay persons, generally free from interference by other court officials. However,
cases deemed to be of importance, perhaps those involving difficult legal
issues, significant economic disputes, sensitive political matters, or highly
charged public issues, are handled by individual judges on advice of the par-
ticular court’s Adjudication Committee. While the individual judge will hear
the case, following consultation the Committee may direct the judge to enter a
particular verdict, invite the judge to seek more information from the parties,
or report the case to a higher level court for guidance. The Committee consists
of the president of the court, the vice-president, the head and deputy head of
the various specialized chambers, and some ordinary judges. Members of the
Committee are also likely to be Party members, and thus the influence of the
CCP should be assumed in all decisions.
Berkman, supra note 121, at 22-23.
299 China: Laws Being Promulgated to Protect IPR, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 10, 1997, avail-
able at 1997 WL 13647865 [hereinafter China: Laws Being Promulgated].
300 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
301 China: Laws Being Promulgated, supra note 299.
302 Id.; see also Mary L. Riley, Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 257,
at 91, 96-97 (discussing the 1997 amendments to the criminal law).
303 Shoukang Guo, China: Status Report on the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
in the PRC, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D5 (Sept. 1, 2000). For dis-
cussions of intellectual property protection for new plant varieties in China, see gen-
erally Lester Ross & Libin Zhang, Agricultural Development and Intellectual Property
Protection for Plant Varieties: China Joins the UPOV, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 226 (2000);
Chengfei Ding, Note, The Protection for New Plant Varieties of American Businesses in
China After China Enters the WTO, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 333 (2001).
304 Noah Smith, China: New Chinese Law Protects Trademarks from Internet
Squatters; Patent Law Revised, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D2 (Aug.
29, 2000).
305 The website of the State Intellectual Property Office is available at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/.
306 See supra text accompanying notes 119-21 (discussing the State Council
Working Conference on Intellectual Property Rights).
307 China: New IPR Commissioner Interviewed, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Apr. 14,
1998, available at 1998 WL 7561417. 
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308 Id.
309 This information network will establish databases providing laws and regula-
tions, patent cases, and information about organizations involved in handling patent
disputes. See China to Launch Nationwide Patent Information Network, CHINA BUS. INFO.
NETWORK, Jan. 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3888595.
310 China: New IPR Commissioner Interviewed, supra note 307. 
311 China: Training Centre to Help Strengthen IPR Protection, CHINA BUS. INFO. NET-
WORK, Jan. 17, 1997, available at 1997 WL 9840723.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 China: First IPR Protection Personnel Center Opens in Beijing, CHINA BUS. INFO.
NETWORK, Apr. 17, 1998, available at 1998 WL 7561463.
315 Yu, Progress, Problems, and Proposals, supra note 194, at 149 (“The People’s
University, the Huazhong Science and Technology University, and the Zhejiang
University now offer a second bachelor degree in intellectual property law.”); Liangjun
Xie, New School Starts on Rights Track, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 16, 1993, available at 1993 WL
10866676 (reporting the opening of the Intellectual Property Rights School at Beijing
University); Shanghai Protects Intellectual Property, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 31, 1994,
available at LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (reporting that Shanghai University has
decided to open an intellectual property department and to communicate with foreign
universities in the field).
316 Universities offering second bachelors degrees in intellectual property law
include the People’s University, the Huazhong Science and Technology University, and
the Zhejiang University. See Yu, Progress, Problems, and Perspectives, supra note 194.
Also, the Beijing University has a school dedicated to intellectual property. See id.
317 Regulations on the Protection of Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits of the
People’s Republic of China, translated in State Intellectual Property Office of the
People’s Republic of China, Laws and Regulations, available at http://www.sipo.gov.
cn/sipo_English/flfg_e/zlflfg_e/200204020002.htm. 
318 Louis S. Sorell, A Comparative Analysis of Selected Aspects of Patent Law in
China and the United States, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 319, 323 (2002) (quoting Ma Lianyuan,
Deputy Commissioner of State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of
China). For discussions of recent amendments to the Chinese patent law, see general-
ly id.; Jiwen Chen, Better Patent Law for International Commitment—The Amendment of
Chinese Patent Law, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 61 (2001).
319 Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 58, available at http://www.
sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/flfg_e/zlflfg_e/200203270002.htm [hereinafter Revised
Patent Law].
320 Id. art. 6.
321 Id. art. 60.
322 Id. art. 11.
323 Id. art. 61.
324 See Chen, supra note 318, at 67-70 (discussing the improved application pro-
cedure).
325 Revised Patent Law, supra note 319, art. 46.
326 Id. arts. 48-55.
327 Id. art. 63.
328 Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China arts. 47, 51, available at
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http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/flfg_e/xgfg_e/200204160012.htm.
329 Id. art. 48.
330 Id. art. 49.
331 Id. art. 52.
332 Id. arts. 10(12), 37(6), 41, 47.
333 Id. art. 53.
334 In determining the “well-known” status of a trademark, one must take into
consideration the following factors:
(1) reputation of the mark to the relevant public;
(2) time for continued use of the mark;
(3) consecutive time, extent and geographical area of advertisement 
of the mark;
(4) records of protection of the mark as a well-known mark; and
(5) any other factors relevant to the reputation of the mark.
Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 14, available at http://www.sipo.
gov.cn/sipo_English/flfg_e/xgfg_e/200204160013.htm.
335 Id. art. 57.
336 Id. art. 56.
337 Id. art. 53.
338 Id. art. 54.
339 OFFICE OF USTR, 2002 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BAR-
RIERS 44, 58-59 (2002).
340 Id. at 57.
341 Id.
342 OFFICE OF USTR, 2000 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BAR-
RIERS 50 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 NTE REPORT]; see also Chow, supra note 120, at 11
(“Although the level of copyright piracy seems to have decreased recently in China due
to aggressive campaigning by copyright owners, trademark counterfeiting continues to
increase.” (footnote omitted)); Tom Korski, AV Piracy Still “Rampant” Despite
Crackdowns, Chinese Authorities Say, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA), at D3
(Jan. 21, 1998) (“[P]iracy of audio-visual products in China remains ‘rampant’ despite
expanded police raids on black marketeers . . . .”).
343 2000 NTE REPORT, supra note 342, at 50.
344 See David M. Lampton, A Growing China in a Shrinking World: Beijing and the
Global Order, in LIVING WITH CHINA, supra note 104, at 120, 121; Yue Ren, China’s
Perceived Image of the United States: Its Sources and Impact, in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONS, supra note 162, at 247, 251 (“From the Chinese point of view, Washington is
sensitive to any power that might pose a challenge to its hegemonic position.”).
345 As commentators explained:
[D]eveloping countries tend to have scarce government resources. As a result,
they resist spending on the enforcement of foreign intellectual property rights.
As with the importation of capital, developing countries often view the impor-
tation of intellectual property as a means of dominating and exploiting the eco-
nomic potential of the importing country. Paying for imports or royalties is
thus seen as an economic burden fostering a negative balance of trade.
Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy,
27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 327, 331 (1993) (footnotes omitted); Edgardo Buscaglia,
Can Intellectual Property in Latin America Be Protected, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
60
IN EMERGING MARKETS 96, 111 (Clarisa Long ed., 2000) (noting that Latin American coun-
tries “have traditionally used intellectual property rights as an instrument for regulat-
ing technology transfer and avoiding royalty payments on innovations from the devel-
oped world”).
346 See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER 223 (1996) (“By 1995, a broad consensus reportedly existed among the
Chinese leaders and scholars that the United States was trying to divide China territo-
rially, subvert it politically, contain it strategically and frustrate it economically.”
(internal quotations omitted)); Lee H. Hamilton, Introduction to BEYOND MFN, supra
note 156, at 1, 7 (“[T]he United States must avoid creating the impression within
China’s elite that it intends to bring down the current system or divide the country.
That, of course, is not the U.S. objective.”).
347 See Elizabeth C. Economy, China’s Environmental Diplomacy, in CHINA AND THE
WORLD: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY FACES THE NEW MILLENNIUM 264, 281 (Samuel S. Kim ed.,
4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE WORLD] (“[T]here was increasing discussion in
the Chinese media suggesting that sustainable development was part of a master plan
by the advanced industrialized countries (and especially the United States) to contain
China by forcing it to slow the pace of economic growth in order to protect the envi-
ronment.”); Paul H.B. Godwin, Force and Diplomacy: China Prepares for the Twenty-first
Century, in CHINA AND THE WORLD, supra, at 171, 178 (“Beijing is convinced that at the
heart of U.S. strategy is the intent to delay, if not prevent, China’s emergence as great
power in the twenty-first century; that the United States views China as the principal
contender for the predominant position of the United States in Asia.”); Michel
Oksenberg, Taiwan, Tibet and Hong Kong in Sino-American Relations, in LIVING WITH
CHINA, supra note 104, at 53, 56 (“[The Chinese leaders] believe that foreign leaders
tend to be reluctant to welcome China’s rise in world affairs and would prefer to delay
or obstruct its progress.”). But see BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 157, at 204 (“The goal
of the United States is not a weak and poor China; it is a China that is stable and demo-
cratic, that does not upset the balance of power in Asia, and that plays within the rules
on such matters as trade and arms proliferation.”); Hamilton, Introduction, supra note
346, at 5 (“The U.S. interest is served by China’s continuing economic development,
for the sake of both improving the material welfare of the Chinese people and foster-
ing political liberalization.”).
348 Harry Harding, Breaking the Impasse over Human Rights, in LIVING WITH CHINA,
supra note 104, at 165, 172. But see BERNSTEIN & MUNRO, supra note 157, at 204 (“The goal
of the United States is not a weak and poor China; it is a China that is stable and demo-
cratic, that does not upset the balance of power in Asia, and that plays within the rules
on such matters as trade and arms proliferation.”); Hamilton, Introduction, supra note
346, at 4 (“China’s stability is in the U.S. interest.”).
349 For discussions of the blossoming software industry in China and the leaders’
eagerness to develop science and technology parks, see generally China: Guangzhou to
Establish “Silicon Valley,” CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Dec. 4, 1998, available at 1998 WL
22707603 (reporting the municipal government’s intention to develop an internation-
al science and technology park); China: Sales of Software Stay Strong Despite Fakes, ASI-
AINFO DAILY CHINA NEWS, June 20, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, ASINFO File
(“Despite the damage done by piracy, China’s software industry is still moving ahead
with sales in 1999 hitting 17.6 billion RMB yuan (US$ 2.13 billion), an increase of 27.5
percent over 1998.”); China: Software Industry Booms in China, CHINA BUS. INFO. NET-
WORK, Oct. 30, 1997, available at 1997 WL 12878806 (reporting a 50% annual growth rate
in the software industry over the past several years).
350 A survey of major U.S. companies conducted by a World Bank affiliate demon-
strated the correlation between intellectual property rights and foreign investment:
48 percent said [the strength or weakness of intellectual property protection]
has a “strong effect” on whether to set up facilities to manufacture components,
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59 percent said it was a determining factor in building overseas facilities to
manufacture complete products, and 80 percent of them said the presence of
such laws was a key factor in whether they would establish research and devel-
opment facilities in a given country.
Josh Martin, Copyright Law Reforms Mean Better Business Climate, J. COM., Mar. 7,
1996, at 2C; see EDWIN MANSFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (1994) (discussing the correlation between intel-
lectual property and foreign investment); Gordon C.K. Cheung, Social Cost Analysis in
Sino-American Disputes over Intellectual Property Rights, in OUTLOOK FOR U.S.-CHINA RELA-
TIONS, supra note 162, at 229, 231 (“[I]nfringement discourages U.S. industries from
product investment, distribution, and marketization.”); Thomas Lagerqvist & Mary L.
Riley, How to Protect Intellectual Property Rights in China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 257, at 7, 8 (listing the loss of foreign investment
and know-how as a cost of counterfeiting); Antonio Medina Mora Icaza, The Mexican
Software Industry, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 232, 236 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS] (“Intellectual property rights protection
in a country is a way to seek the trust of foreign investors in the country that will allow
its economy to grow.”); A.R.C. Westwood, Preface to GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTU-
AL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra, at v, vi (discussing how corporations will be hesitant to do
business in countries that do not provide intellectual property); see also Robert M.
Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment Stimulation: The Rating of
Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA 261, 265 (1997) (using foreign invest-
ment as one of the variables in measuring intellectual property protection in a less
developed country); Mickey Mouse Back in China, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1993, at D4
(reporting that Disney bought Mickey Mouse back to China after a self-imposed four-
year absence due to copyright infringements). But see A. Samuel Oddi, The
International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 831, 849 (noting that patent protection seems an unlikely determinative factor for
deciding whether or not to invest in a foreign country).
351 See MANSFIELD, supra note 350, at 20 (“[T]he strength or weakness of a coun-
try’s system of intellectual property protection seems to have a substantial effect, par-
ticularly in high-technology industries, on the kinds of technology transferred by
many U.S. firms to that country.”); SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLI-
TICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 214 (1998) (arguing that an operational
intellectual property regime will promote foreign investment); Edmund W. Kitch, The
Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 175-76 (1994) (same).
Technology transfer is very important to a less developed country:
[Without technology transfer], the country will have to try to develop its own
technological capability without sharing in the common pool of existing tech-
nology developed by others. This in turn will mean that its nationals and firms
will develop technological solutions, methods, and products which are differ-
ent from prevailing international standards. This will isolate the domestic
economy from the international economy, and deny the country the advan-
tages of international exchange of both goods and services. Such economic iso-
lation in turn increases the difficulty of enhancing the national technological
base.
Id. at 176. However, Professor Oddi suggested that the granting of intellectual property
protection such as patents may actually retard technology transfer. As he explained:
The foreign owner may have little incentive to transfer technical information
related to that patent invention if the owner is deriving significant profits from
having an import monopoly on that invention. Moreover, even though sources
other than the patent owner may be willing to transfer adequate technical
information into the country, domestic enterprises would be foolish to pay for
such technology because the patent owner could bar domestic production on
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the basis of the patent. The existence of the patent therefore precludes com-
petition in technology available from third-party sources.
Oddi, supra note 350, at 852.
352 See Lagerqvist & Riley, supra note 350, at 9; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CON-
TRIBUTION OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY TO THE CHINESE ECONOMY 4 (1998) (estimating that
a 60% decrease in piracy would translate into more than $466 million in tax receipts).
353 See Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 27, at 136-37 (noting
that emerging entrepreneurs, authors, and creative artists will be unable to capture the
benefits of their inventions, innovations, and creative endeavors); Robert Merges,
Battle of the Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and Trade, 8 B.U. INT’L L.J. 239, 246 (1990)
(“A recording industry flourished in Hong Kong for the first time after the passage of a
copyright act protecting sound recordings; the Indian software industry saw a growth
surge after a copyright was extended to software . . . .”); Robert Sherwood, Why a
Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for the World [hereinafter Sherwood,
Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense], in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 350, at 68, 72 (noting that “immediately after
Mexico reformed its patent law in June 1991, large numbers of patent applications
were filed by Mexican nationals.”); id. (“A small but striking before-and-after shift
comes from Colombia when copyright protection for software took effect in 1989. More
than 100 Colombian nationals have since produced application software packages that
have been registered with the copyright office, with hundreds more written but not
registered.”).
354 For example, adulterated drugs and counterfeit products will lead to illness,
extended injuries, and unnecessary deaths. See Alford, Making the World Safe for What?,
supra note 27, at 136.
355 Id. at 137; see also Kenneth Ho, A Study in the Problem of Software Piracy in
Hong Kong and China ¶ 2.6 (1995), available at http://info.gov.hk/ipd/eng/information
/studyaids/piracy_hk_china.htm (last visited May 26, 2002) (noting that legitimate
copies of software are 20% more expensive in Hong Kong than they are in the United
States).
356 As commentators explained:
Trademark protection provides various types of benefits to consumers which
are important for a consumer-based economy that offers a wide range of goods.
One such benefit is quality control, which can actually promote economic
activity in a market. Trademarks tie responsibility for the content and quality
of products to the specific producers of those products, and in this way can
assure the consumer of a certain level of quality associated with a product.
If the consumer cannot distinguish between high and low quality products
in the market, then the low quality merchandise may chase the high quality
merchandise out of the market altogether as consumers become discouraged
and buy less. The market then shrinks and may even disappear. 
This informational asymmetry results in an externality to the market that
can reduce economic activity. Lacking full information, potential buyers can-
not discern the actual quality of individual products in the market but can dis-
cern the average quality in the market, and, therefore, are only willing to pay
a price that reflects this average. Potential producers know the actual quality
of their products, and at the price reflecting the average quality, potential pro-
ducers of more costly, higher quality goods stay out of the market.
Janet H. MacLaughlin et al., The Economic Significance of Piracy, in GLOBAL CONSENSUS,
GLOBAL CONFLICT?, supra note 4, at 89, 103 (footnotes omitted), see also George Akerloff,
The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON.
488 (1970) (analyzing market dynamics when the supply of goods was subject to vary-
ing degrees of quality known only by the individual producers and not the consumers);
Alford, Making the World Safe for What?, supra note 193, at 137 (stating that fake prod-
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ucts were so prominent in Shanghai that government officials had to inform citizens
over the airwaves where they could purchase legitimate products).
357 See Giunta & Shang, supra note 345, at 341 (“Many of [the less developed]
countries fail to realize that prices in countries that respect intellectual property are
not necessarily higher than prices in those countries where piracy abounds.”);
Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense, supra note 353, at
82 (“In [some cases], notably pharmaceuticals, the price at which the imitation is sold
is often nearly as high as the original.”); James W. Peters, Comment, Toward Negotiating
a Remedy to Copyright Piracy in Singapore, 7 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 561, 589 (1986)
(“Pirated works are not necessarily cheaper than the originals.”).
358 Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the Intellectual Property Protection
Debate: Are the North and South Arguing Past Each Other When We Say “Property”? A
Lockean, Confucian, and Islamic Comparison, 2 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307, 345
(1996); see also ROBERT SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
156 (1990) (describing a reverse “brain drain” in South Korea after its implementation
of intellectual property laws in 1987). Robert Sherwood explained the impact of inad-
equate intellectual property protection on human resources as follows:
Students who have gone abroad, prefer to stay abroad. Researchers on the
verge of innovation, leave for a protected environment to complete their work.
Technically skilled people are not much stimulated to do creative work when
assigned the task of copying and imitation. The research establishment does
not flourish and patterns for financing new technology are not developed.…
Id. at 174; see also Kitch, supra note 351, at 174 (arguing that technologically sophisti-
cated students who obtain employment outside the country may, “over time, become
comfortable in their place of employment and will resist ever returning to their coun-
try of origin”). This loss of talents is particularly devastating in light of the blossoming
software industry and the country’s eagerness to develop science and technology
parks. See China: Guangzhou to Establish “Silicon Valley,” CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Dec.
4, 1998, available at 1998 WL 22707603 (reporting the municipal government’s inten-
tion to develop an international science and technology park); China: Sales of Software
Stay Strong Despite Fakes, ASIAINFO DAILY CHINA NEWS, June 20, 2000, available at LEXIS,
News Library, ASINFO File (“Despite the damage done by piracy, China’s software
industry is still moving ahead with sales in 1999 hitting 17.6 billion RMB yuan (US$
2.13 billion), an increase of 27.5 percent over 1998.”); China: Software Industry Booms
in China, CHINA BUS. INFO. NETWORK, Oct. 30, 1997, available at 1997 WL 12878806
(reporting a 50% annual growth rate in the software industry over the past several
years).
359 Blustein & Chandler, supra note 1.
360 China became the 143rd member of the WTO on December 11, 2001.
361 See, e.g., GREG MASTEL, THE RISE OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY: THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
EMERGES 176 (1997) (cautioning that China’s accession to the WTO is “a double-edged
sword”).
362 See Yu, Ramifications of China’s Entry into the WTO, supra note 2 (discussing the
optimistic and pessimistic views of China’s entry into the WTO).




367 Professor Chow discussed the difficulties of proving China’s noncompliance of
the enforcement obligations under the TRIPs Agreement:
Part III of TRIPS creates specific enforcement obligations and raising the coun-
64
terfeiting and piracy issue after China’s admission into the WTO will most like-
ly take place in the context of arguing that China’s enforcement efforts fail to
satisfy TRIPS enforcement obligations. The burden of proof and persuasion
will be upon the complaining party. Meeting these burdens will require the
complaining party to gather evidence of China’s failure to meet its obliga-
tions—a task that could take years given the complexity of the enforcement
environment in China today—and would also require the party to prove its
case before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. Not only will this be a long
process requiring several years, but there is no guarantee that the party raising
the dispute would succeed given that it now has all of the burdens of proof and
going forward.
Id. at 253-54.
368 Id. at 254. As Professor Chow queried: “[I]f China can enter the world’s fore-
most commercial law regime and be recognized as a member of the world trading com-
munity despite having the world’s most serious piracy problem, what incentive is
there to improve the problem and to commit the considerable resources that this
would require?” Id.
369 See Yu, Ramifications of China’s Entry into the WTO, supra note 2 (arguing that
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